Implementation of cost as an independent variable : an AIM-9X case study by Gaddis, Don
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1998-09-01
Implementation of cost as an independent variable :
an AIM-9X case study
Gaddis, Don










COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:




Thesis Advisor: Kenneth Euske
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No O-Q-l-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching
existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden
estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for
Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget,
Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1 . AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
December 1998
3 REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE










9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Air-to-Air Missiles Joint Program Office PMA-259
Integrated Program Team BLDG. 2273
Patuxent River, MD 20670-1547
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of
Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE:
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This research is a single case study of the implementation of Department of Defense (DoD) Cost as an Independent
Variable (CAIV) into the AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missile program to determine if CAIV has the attributes of a strategic
management control system. Environmental forces—budgetary pressures, modernization requirements, and military performance
requirements—have imposed upon DoD a need to change the way it conducts business, and implement an affordable, "best value"
acquisition strategy through implementation of policies such as CAIV. However, there does not exist a managerial framework to
assist the program manager in how to implement CAIV. There exist too many definitions of CAIV and priorities differ about what
is the most important CAIV objective. This research uses DoD publications, memorandums, Internet websites, and published
academic books and papers to review CAIV objectives, and the use of management control systems in commercial industry and
DoD. After studying how the AIM-9X program implemented CAIV, this thesis analyzes and discusses CAIV in terms of a
strategic management control system. When control is used in the sense of implementing strategy, CAIV has the attributes of a
strategic management control system. CAIV has the capability to control individual behavior and incentives that lead to decisions
affecting higher costs. Viewing CAIV in this managerial framework may assist DoD in implementing its affordability strategy.
14. SUBJECT TERMS







1 8. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF
THIS PAGE
Unclassified






NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)






Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
IMPLEMENTATION OF COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE:
AN AIM-9X CASE STUDY
Don Gaddis
Commander, United States Navy
B.S., Auburn University, 1980
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






This research is a single case study of the implementation of Department of
Defense (DoD) Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) into the AIM-9X Sidewinder
air-to-air missile program to determine if CAIV has the attributes of a strategic
management control system. Environmental forces—budgetary pressures, modernization
requirements, and military performance requirements—have imposed upon DoD a need
to change the way it conducts business, and implement an affordable, "best value"
acquisition strategy through implementation of policies such as CAIV. However, there
does not exist a managerial framework to assist the program manager in how to
implement CAIV. There exist too many definitions of CAIV and priorities differ about
what is the most important CAIV objective. This research uses DoD publications,
memorandums, Internet websites, and published academic books and papers to review
CAIV objectives, and the use of management control systems in commercial industry and
DoD. After studying how the AIM-9X program implemented CAIV, this thesis analyzes
and discusses CAIV in terms of a strategic management control system. When control is
used in the sense of implementing strategy, CAIV has the attributes of a strategic
management control system. CAIV has the capability to control individual behavior and
incentives that lead to decisions affecting higher costs. Viewing CAIV in this managerial






/. Cost as an Independent Variable 2
2. AIM-9X Program 3
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 4
1. Primary research questions: 4
2. Secondary research questions: 4
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 5
E. RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY 6
1. Analytical Strategy: A Five-Step Process 6
2. Methodology 6
F. Organization of study 9
II. DOD ENVIRONMENT 1
1
A. OVERVIEW 11
B. Budgetary Pressures 11
C. Modernization 14
D. Military Requirements 19
E. Acquisition Reform strategy 23
1. Acquisition Strategy 24
2. Focus on Affordability 25
3. Acquisition Reform Initiatives 26
F. Strategic uncertainties 27
G. Summary 28




/. Setting Aggressive Cost Objectives 34
2. Manage Risk 34
3. Incentivesfor Achieving Cost Objectives 35
4. Metrics 36
5. Fielded Systems 38
D. Cost Reduction activities 38
E. Cost-Performance IPT 39
/. IPTs 40
2. Cost-Performance IPT. 42
F. Summary 46
IV. MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS AND CAIV 47
A. OVERVIEW 47
B. MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM 47
/. What is a Management Control System? 47
2. Elements ofa Management Control System 50
3. Factors in Effective Management Control. 52
C. MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN DOD 54
1. Federal Definitions and Concepts 55
2. DoD Definitions and Concepts 56
3. Management Control in DoD Major Defense Acquisition Programs 58
D. DIFFERENCES IN DOD & COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT CONTROL 61
Vll
E. Summary 65




2. Operational Requirements 69
C. Program Goals and organiztion 71
/. AIM-9X Goals and Objectives 71
2. Program Office IPT Structure 71
3. Cost-Performance IPT. 73
4. Scope ofthe Affordability IPT 73
Working Environment 74
D. Implementation of CAIV 75
/. Cost-Performance TradeoffProcess 75
2. Metrics 88
3. Incentives 90
4. Risk Management 95
E. Cost Savings 96
F. Summary of CAIV implementation into aim-9x 98
VI. CAIV AS A STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM 100
A. OVERVIEW 100
B. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM 101
/. Strategic Management Control System Model 101
2. Summary 110
C. CAIV: SIMONS FOUR LEVERS OF CONTROL 1 1
1
1. BeliefSystem Ill
2. Boundary System 112
3. Diagnostic System 113
4. Interactive System 114
D. Summary 117
VII. CAIV IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 120
A. OVERVIEW 120
B. Program ownership 120
C. Relationship Between Cost and Requirements 122
D. Trade Space '. 124
E. Summary 126




D. Areas for further research 131
/. Cost savings versus cost avoidance 131
2. Formulation ofAcquisition Strategy 132
APPENDIX A—SIMON'S FOUR LEVERS OF CONTROL 134
APPENDIX B—AIM-9X PROGRAM EXIT CRITERIA 138
LIST OF REFERENCES 140




This research is a single case study of the implementation of Department of
Defense (DoD) Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) into the AIM-9X Sidewinder
air-to-air missile program at Commander, Naval Air Systems Command. The research
objective is to analyze the implementation of CAIV in the AIM-9X program office and to
determine if CAIV has the attributes of a strategic management control system.
Environmental forces—budgetary pressures, modernization requirements, and
military performance requirements—have imposed upon DoD a need to change the way
it conducts business. Acquisition reform represents a new directional strategy for DoD.
CAIV is one of many acquisition reform initiatives designed to produce weapon systems
"faster, cheaper, and better," and its effectiveness lies in its ability to change individual
behaviors and incentives that lead to decisions affecting higher or lower cost.
However, from the research it is evident that many definitions of CAIV exist, the
definitions are ambiguous, and different organizations in DoD have different priorities
about what is important in implementing CAIV. This research illustrates that a
conceptual approach, a managerial framework, or a theoretical construct of how to think
about CAIV does not exist. It proposes that CAIV is really a strategic management
control system, partly responsible for the implementation of acquisition reform strategy.
B. OVERVIEW
1. Cost as an Independent Variable
DoD introduced CAIV as a new initiative in its 04 December 1 995 memorandum
to the Service Acquisition Executives. (Kaminski, 1995) Attached to the memorandum
is a DoD CAIV Working Group Report, which outlines the principle CAIV objectives
program managers are to implement into program management. An earlier Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy memorandum in July 1995 committed DoD "to
establishing a process whereby cost is an independent variable in programmatic
decisions, and cost goals are set in each program phase." (Kaminski, 1995) Cost then
becomes the "key driver" of performance and schedule. (Defense Systems Management
College, 1997) CAIV policy became a major theme in the Department of Defense
Directive (DoDD) 5000.1. It states that due to fiscal constraints, cost must be viewed as
an independent variable, and program managers, after establishing aggressive cost goals,
must trade off performance and schedule parameters to meet identified life cycle cost
targets.
Dr. Kaminski, former Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology
(USD(A&T)), outlined the new CAIV "strategy" to develop and field affordable weapon
systems. (Kaminski, 1995)
This strategy uses the best value approach which requires that we
thoroughly scrub program goals, not only for unnecessary military
specifications, regulations, and data, but also—and more importantly
—
for marginal performance improvements that have little to do with actual
combat effectiveness, but can drive up cost and schedule through
unnecessary program risk. (Kaminski, 1995)
After releasing the CAIV memorandums. Dr. Longuemare, former Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology (PDUSD(A&T)),
nominated eight "Flagship" programs to closely monitor the implementation of the CAIV
principles, share ideas, gather information, and assess the value of the CAIV policy.
(Longuemare, 1996) The eight "Flagship" programs nominated by Dr. Longuemare are
as follows.
• Army: ATACMS/BAT(P3I), Crusader
• Navy: AIM-9X, MIDS
• Air Force: SBIRS, JASSM, EELV
• Joint Strike Fighter
2. AIM-9X Program
The AIM-9X air-to-air missile program was chosen as a case study of the CAIV
implementation process because of its status as a "Flagship" program. The missile is a
major modification to the currently deployed AIM-9M Sidewinder (Figure 1-1).
Figure 1-1, AIM-9M Sidewinder
The Sidewinder is a launch and leave; air-to-air guided missile equipped with
solid state electronics, which employs an infrared guidance control system. (U.S. Navy
Program Guide, 1998) It is a Navy-led joint Navy and Air Force acquisition program.
The AIM-9X Sidewinder will employ focal plane array technology for its
guidance control section, a highly maneuverable airframe, and signal processors that
enhance its kinematics and infrared countermeasures capabilities. (U.S. Navy Program
Guide, 1998) The missile is expected to provide U.S. fighters with air superiority into the
next century. (U.S. Navy Program Guide, 1998) The Navy's F/A-18 C/D/E/F Hornet,
and the Air Force's F-16 Fighting Falcon, F-15 Eagle, and F-22 aircraft are currently
programmed to carry the AIM-9X Sidewinder. (AIM-9X SAMP, 1997)
The AIM-9X program office immediately began implementation of the new
CAIV policy in December 1995. The AIM-9X program manager had to demonstrate
successful CAIV implementation prior to DoD Milestone II approval to proceed into
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (E&MD). The AIM-9X program
continues to use CAIV in E&MD.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary research questions:
• Does CAIV have the attributes of a strategic management control system?
• In what ways does CAIV control the implementation of the acquisition reform
strategy?
2. Secondary research questions:
• How did the AIM-9X program implement CAIV?
• What is the scope and function of the affordability Integrated Product Team
(IPT)? How are decisions made? Who makes the final decision?
• What cost reduction activities did the program office engage in?
• Can the program quantify cost savings from CAIV implementation?
• What incentives did the program office and contractor use to influence
behaviors and incentives?
• What standards did the program use to assess successful implementation of
CAIV?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of the thesis includes an overview of the DoD budget environment, a
review ofOSD CAIV policy, and a review of management control systems in DoD and in
commercial industry.
The AIM-9X case study includes an embedded study of program management,
and an embedded study of the program's Affordability IPT. The case study focuses on
how the program office implemented CAIV, and what behaviors and incentives changed
as a result of its implementation. The following case study discussion illustrates how
CAIV is really a strategic management control system, and the ways in which the
program office uses CAIV to control behavior, and ultimately the implementation of
DoD acquisition reform strategy.
My understanding and analysis of the material in this thesis is influenced by my
direct participation as AIM-9X requirements action officer for Director, Air Warfare
(N88) staff for the Chief ofNaval Operations.
E. RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY
1. Analytical Strategy: A Five-Step Process
• Explain how environmental forces operating in DoD imposed a change in
DoD acquisition strategy.
• Describe CAIV objectives, principles, and cost reduction activities.
• Review the use of management control systems in DoD and in commercial
industry, then analyze CAIV from the perspective that it is a strategic
management control system.
• Build an explanation ofhow the AIM-9X program implemented CAIV.
• Discuss findings from the AIM-9X case study to determine if CAIV has the
attributes of a management control system, and in what ways it is used to
implement strategy.
2. Methodology
a) Researchfor Analytical Strategy: Steps 1-3
Research in the following areas supports the first three steps of my
analytical strategy.
• Unclassified Department of Defense publication and memorandums
• References, publications and electronic media (e.g., Defense Technical
Information Center) available at the Naval Postgraduate School library
• Department of Defense internet websites
• Published academic books and papers
b) ResearchforA nalytical Strategy: Steps 4-5
A case study of CAIV implementation into the AIM-9X program support
steps four and five of my analytical strategy. The basic unit of analysis is the program
office. Units of analysis embedded in the AIM-9X program office are the program
manager, and the Affordability IPT manager. Units of analysis outside the AIM-9X
program office include the Raytheon Defense Systems AIM-9X program manager, the
current AIM-9X resource sponsor at Chief of Naval Operations, and the author's past
experience as AIM-9X resource sponsor at Chief of Naval Operations. Table 1-1 ties
together primary and secondary research questions, sources of evidence, and units of
analysis.
Research Questions Sources of Evidence Unit of Analysis
Does CAIV have the attributes of a
strategic management control system?
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Table 1-1, Summary of Sources of Evidence and 1 Jnits of Analysis
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II provides an overview of the DoD environment in terms of a fiscally
constrained budget, modernization requirements, and military performance requirements.
The chapter discusses behaviors and incentives that result from these environmental
forces and how a new acquisition strategy has emerged, which is an attempt to change
behaviors and incentives and focus on developing and acquiring affordable weapon
systems. The chapter then outlines strategic uncertainties, which threaten implementation
of the new acquisition strategy.
Chapter III discusses in detail CAIV definitions, objectives, cost reduction
activities, and functions of the Cost-Performance IPT. The chapter identifies ambiguous
definitions of CAIV, and conflicting priorities in CAIV implementation between DoD
CAIV policy and Department of the Navy CAIV policy. The chapter points out that the
mere implementation of CAIV objectives is not a "conceptual approach," and that DoD
does not provide a managerial framework to program managers for the implementation of
CAIV.
Chapter IV is a review of the commercial industry approach to management
control systems compared to the DoD approach to management control systems. The
chapter develops a generic management control system model that I use later in Chapter
VI to test the proposition that CAIV has the attributes of a strategic management control
system. Additionally, the chapter describes Simons' framework of control systems,
outlined in his book, Levers ofControl (1995), which I also use in Chapter VI to describe
the ways in which the CAIV control system implemented acquisition reform strategy.
Chapter V is the AIM-9X case study. The structure of the chapter parallels the
DoD CAIV working group report's list of CAIV objectives. The chapter describes in
detail the history of the program's experience with CAIV implementation, and how it
affected organizational behavior and incentives.
Chapter VI analyzes seemingly disjointed information from the AIM-9X case
study using the two management control models discussed earlier in Chapter IV. The
purpose is to illustrate that CAIV functions as a strategic control system, and is the
managerial framework program managers need to implement DoD acquisition strategy.
Chapter VII continues the analysis and discussion by highlighting three special issues
—
program ownership, cost models, and trade space—that program managers should
consider during the implementation of CAIV into their programs
Chapter VIII summarizes research findings, lists major conclusions, and




This chapter describes the DoD environment in which CAIV operates. A first
step toward evaluating CAIV implementation into the AIM-9X program is to understand
how several forces within DoD shape the environment. The forces described in this
chapter not only shape the environment, but significantly influence DoD weapons
acquisition strategy, influence and incentivize participant's behaviors in implementing
the acquisition strategy, and assist in identifying uncertainties of whether the strategy will
succeed or not.
The following sections describe the DoD environment in terms of declining
budgetary pressures, modernization requirements, military performance requirements,
and acquisition reform initiatives. These forces significantly influence the formation of a
new "cheaper, faster, better" weapons acquisition strategy. (Gansler, 1998)
B. BUDGETARY PRESSURES
The size of the defense budget has dramatically declined over the last decade. In
1985, at the peak of President Reagan's defense buildup, the DoD budget was $390B, or
6.2 percent of GDP. Today, President Clinton's FY 1999 defense budget is $257B, or 3.1
percent of GDP. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which placed statutory caps on
discretionary spending, the Bipartisan agreement between President Clinton and
Congress to balance the budget by 2002, and the need to address long-term budgeting
requirements for Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and the National Debt continue to
place downward pressures on defense spending.
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Between FY 1 992 and FY 1 996 national defense spending decreased a total of 1
1
percent, while during the same time frame total national expenditures rose 13 percent.
(Congressional Research Survey Report, 1997) According to DoD DefenseLink, in the
FY 1999 President's Budget, the DoD Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) barely keeps
up with projected inflation (Table 2-1).
SB FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
Total DoD 267.6 270.6 275.9 283.8 287.1 297.1
Real Growth 0% -1.1% 0% +.9% -1.1% +1.1%
Table 2-1, Total Spending in DoD 1998 Future Years Defense Plan
Source: DoD Defense Link (1998)
Defense budgeting affects behaviors and incentives in several ways. First,
program managers compete with each other to keep their weapon programs funded within
a fiscally constrained budget. DoD considers a program successful if individual service
executives, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Congressional Authorization and
Appropriation committees annually approve funding for next year's installment. (GAO-
T/NSAID-98-123,p.l5)
Because approval must be secured every year, a program manager has an
incentive to make the program look attractive as possible. (GAO-T/NSAID-98-123,
p. 17) Optimistic cost, schedule, and technology estimates help create a favorable image
for a program. It is much easier for a program to obtain DoD approval and begin product
development with optimistic cost estimates. DoD does not reward program managers for
recognizing potential problems, and little incentive to admitting to higher risks than is
necessary. (GAO-T/NSAID-98-123, p. 17)
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As a program proceeds through E&MD, and comes closer to production, the
incentive for program managers to present optimistic information intensifies.
(GAO/NSAID-93-15, p.45) The program commands increasing funds and faces criticism
from every level of DoD. Program managers, and their sponsors, have a deposition to
protect the program from disruption. (GAO/NSAID-93-15, p.46) In the face of
criticism, a developmental weapon program is "pulled" through to completion by its
advocates. At the same time, a program continually competes for annual funding with
other programs being "pushed" into the budget by its advocates. (GAO/NSAID-93-15,
H
As defense appropriations decrease, a manager has the incentive to accept even
greater risk, in terms of optimistic cost, schedule, and technology estimates. A manager's
incentive is to maintain funding, and remain in the budget in a fiscally constrained,
competitive environment. (GAO/NSAID-93-15, p.2)
Lastly, in an environment with intense budgetary pressures, a program manager's
behavior reflects that of a program advocate, who is "selling" the program.
(GAO/NSAID-93-123, p. 15) A 1994 Defense Systems Management College study
conducted for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology found that
a program manager's behavior reflected that of a program advocate. (GAO-T/NSAID-
98-123, p.16)
During the coarse of program development over 40 line and staff participants
have veto power over the program. (Gansler, 1991, p. 147) A program's budget request
must survive repetitive reviews from the service comptrollers, service secretaries, OSD
secretaries, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and four congressional
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committees. Each program must successfully pass a Defense Acquisition Board review
in which parts of the review—Operational Test reports and independent cost estimates-
are beyond the program's control. (Gansler, 1991, p. 146) At every step of program
development, there are participants in the process challenging the validity of the
program's cost, schedule, and performance parameters. A Program Manager protects,
advocates, and "sells" the program to ensure its continuance. Program managers, and its
sponsors, realize that bad news can tip the argument in favor of their critics, leading to
reduced funding or termination. (GAO/NSAID-93-15, p. 47)
C. MODERNIZATION
Because of budget reductions, DoD has delayed force modernization over the last
decade. The Department's reductions in spending have come disproportionately from
reductions in procurement spending. Between FY 1985 and FY 1997 DoD weapon
procurement accounts have declined in real terms by 70 percent. (Congressional
Research Survey Report, 1997) The decision to cut weapon procurement so drastically
reflects changing national priorities initiated by the Bush Administration, and continued
by the Clinton Administration, after the end of the Cold War (Figure 2-1). This approach
was also possible because of the large quantities of modern equipment purchased during
the 1980s under the Reagan Administration. (DoD QDR, 1997)
14
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Figure 2-1 Source: USD(C) Green Book
The downside of reducing the Department's programmed procurement is delayed
modernization, and accumulation of a demand for longer term commitments of military
equipment and hardware, known as the "bow wave". (DoD QDR, 1997) Many weapons
systems and platforms purchased in the 1980s will reach the end of their useful lives over
the next decade. The result is a requirement to increase procurement funding to replace
older equipment. Figure 2-2 illustrates what looks like a "bow wave" of funding required
for aircraft purchases beginning in FY 1996, and peaking in FY 2010, as expressed by the
percentage of total DoD Budget Authority dedicated to aircraft procurement. In FY
1996, aircraft procurement was 2.6 percent of total DoD Budget Authority, whereas in
FY 2010 aircraft procurement will make up nearly 8.0 percent of total DoD Budget
Authority. (GAO/NSAID-97-88, p. 8)
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In the last several years the Defense Department has shifted focus away from
managing large budget reductions in total spending to finding methods to modernize its
existing force structure. Despite budgetary pressures that keep total DoD spending flat
through at least FY 2001, the Department has established a goal of increasing weapon
procurement funding to roughly $60 billion by FY 2001. (DoD QDR, 1998)
The Quadrennial Defense Review examined U.S. security threats, defense
posture, and force structure requirements for the post-Cold War era, and detailed a plan to
ensure that the U.S. could meet its goal to modernize U.S. weapons. In the FY 1999
President's Budget, DoD increased weapon procurement funding to support
implementation of Quadrennial Defense Review recommendations (Table 2-2).
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$B FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03
QDR Goal 49.0 54.0 60.0 61.0 62.0
FY1 999 Budget 48.7 54.1 61.3 60.7 63.5
Table 2-2, QDR Goals and FY 1999 President's Budget
Source: DoD Defense Link (1998)
The challenge facing DoD today is how to fund increased weapon procurement,
and modernize U.S. defense forces, when current budget projections remain flat. Military
requirements that drive the QDR goal to increase procurement funding up to $60B will be
extremely challenging to meet in a fiscally constrained environment.
Modernization of U.S. defense forces is a requirements decision, which will
directly affect costs. It is an organizational decision, based upon individual behaviors
and incentives. DoD has a made a requirements decision to develop and produce new
weapon systems rather than upgrading existing ones, or extending the service life of
existing weapon systems (i.e., F-22, V-22, SSN-21, Seawolf, DD-21, Joint Strike Fighter,
F/A-18E/F, Comanche Helicopter).
The defense programs mentioned above have fiscal resources programmed and
budgeted into the Future Years Defense Plan for their development. However, as
discussed previously, the constrained budget environment encourages program managers
to accept optimistic cost, schedule, and technology estimates, which suggest these
modernization programs will be more expensive than planned.
GAO research showed that unanticipated cost growth in DoD has averaged at
least 20 percent over the life of a weapon program. (GAO/NSAID-97-103, p.2) The cost
growth is attributable to longer than anticipated development and production schedules.
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(GAO/NSAID-97-103, p.2) The same report states that rather than outright cancellation
of programs in order to fund the higher priority programs, service executives choose to
sustain weapon programs by longer development schedules and reduced procurement
rates, which lead to increased unit and life cycle costs. The report is critical of a DoD
"business as usual approach," and makes the following comment.
We found DoD's optimistic acquisition strategies are rarely achieved
because of DoD's decisions to fund new programs in low-rate initial
production and to reduce funding for programs in full rate production.
Consequently, weapon systems are produced at less than planned rates,
causing schedules to be stretched out and increasing costs by billions of
dollars. (GAO/NSAID-97-103, p.2)
GAO presents evidence that program schedule estimates may not be reasonable.
Table 2-3 summarizes the length of time between program initiation and fielding of














8.53 10.49 1.96 22.94
Aircraft(ll) 8.36 9.75 1.39 16.57
Ground
Vehicles (3)
6.75 8.67 1.92 28.38
Missiles (10) 8.97 11.47 2.50 27.86
Ships (3) 7.36 9.17 1.81 24.57
Other (5) 9.75 11.98 2.23 22.91





The same GAO report states that costs and schedules grow together.
(GAO/NSAID-93-15, p.21) Costs grow as a result of optimistic assumptions about
planned production rates, savings from competition, material costs, exclusion of relevant
program costs such as training equipment, and the magnitude of the technological effort.
Schedules grow because of optimistic assumptions about the risks associated with the
technology required to meet performance requirements. (GAO/NSAID-93-15, p.22)
GAO is critical of DoD's tendency to underestimate program costs, which has
resulted in more programs being started than can be executed. (GAO/NSAID-93-15,
p.21) Fiscal constraints and optimistic estimates cause production schedules to be
stretched, which lead to further increases in program costs. 1 Additionally, the gap
between projected funds and actual funds in the FYDP further complicates DoD plans to
fund modernization programs. (GAO/T-NSAID-97-103, p.2; GAO/NSAID-93-15, p.22)
D. MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
The U.S. defense industry has historically been driven by technology not costs.
(Gansler, 1980, p.l 1) The technology paradigm made explicit that U.S. weapons, in the
face of Soviet numerical superiority, would be superior in technology, capabilities, and
performance requirements. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, and any significant
military threat to this country, the military requirement to build only the most
technologically superior weapons continues to drive weapon programs in today's post-
Cold War Era. Defense Secretary Cohen, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued for this
1 A few examples from GAO reports: Army's Javelin production schedule increased 6-10 years at a cost of
$1B, Navy's V-22 program 3 years behind schedule and unit cost increase to $40M (GAO/NSIAD-93-15),
GAO/T-NSAID-97-103, page 2 and GAO/NSAID-93-15, page 22.
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approach in the Quadrennial Defense Review by citing "asymmetric threats"(i.e. low cost
cruise missiles and nuclear, chemical, biological weapons), and Russian exports of its
leading edge weapons technologies to Third World countries as threats to national
security. The Quadrennial Defense Review continues to demand only the most
technologically advanced weapons for the military user. (DoD QDR, 1 997)
The result is a culture that exists among military requirements officers, defense
officials, and defense contractors, who freely expect increased weapon capabilities with
little regard towards cost. (Gansler, 1991, p. 122) GAO continually questions the costs of
high technology performance requirements specified by the military requirements
community, and, for example, their need for F-22, V-22, F/A-18E/F, AV-8B, and JSF in
the face of a diminished threat. (GAO/HR-95-4, p.6) Cost considerations play a
secondary role in the military culture for several reasons.
First, users want to reinforce the impression that there is a valid and legitimate
need for the weapon. (Farrell, 1 997, p. 82) Each weapon system has a set of operational
performance requirements that state what the final product should do. The user often
presses for detailed performance requirements early in the development cycle to reinforce
the need for the weapon. However, setting detailed performance requirements early in a
weapon development cycle may restrict optimal, less costly solutions. The user has little
incentive to trade off performance requirements for less costly solutions when a
legitimate, validated military requirement exists. 2
2 From my experience on the Chief of Naval Operations staff the requirements validation process is
exhaustive for Major Defense Acquisition Programs. The Operational Requirements Document is signed
by the military service chief only after a lengthy internal review process, then is subject to external review
by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The Vice-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, chairs the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviews and validates a
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If the user begins trading off operational requirements, then the requirement was
not so urgent and required after all. Farrell accurately points out that lowering
operational requirements would undermine the institutional alliance and consensus
building required for getting a weapon approved for development and production.
(Farrell, 1997, p.82)
Historically, rather than make a cost-performance tradeoff, the military
requirements culture pushes for the greatest possible technological performance
regardless of cost, often "gold-plating" the operational requirement. (Farrell, 1997, p.83)
Gansler states that the result is the user turning over an overspecified and underfunded
requirement to the acquisition community for development. (Gansler, 1991, p. 147)
Second, detailed performance requirements is also a way requirements officers
can protect favored leading edge technologies, which they do not want to trade away. A
GAO report found that, unlike commercial companies, DoD programs allow technology
development to continue into product development, then understate the risk present.
(GAO-T/NSAID-98-123, p. 15) For example, several key technologies are still immature
and unproven in the F-22, and will not be proven until 40 aircraft have been produced.
The C- 1 7 had less than 60 percent of its engineering design completed prior to its critical
design review; the F-22 had less than a 33 percent completed. (GAO-T/NSAID-98-123,
p.9) In the competition for annual funding, the program manager has incentives to accept
program's key operational requirements, schedule, and cost parameters. The military requirements
community questions, reviews, and validates every requirement in the Operationaal Requirements
Document, as a legitimate defense force structure need. Cost/benefit analysis, called the Analysis of
Alternatives, must support all requirements, and all assumptions in the cost/benefit analysis are questioned
during the review process. The acquisition community is then tasked with developing and producing the
weapon system.
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more unknown, immature technologies to meet more of the detailed operational
performance requirements. (GAO-17NSAID-98-123, p. 15) The military requirements
culture encourages this behavior because it enhances weapon performance vis-a-vis the
threat, which is why the weapon is developed in the first place, and it further legitimizes
the performance requirement.
The AIM-9X program is certainly not immune from the technology paradigm.
Table 2-4 summarizes Sidewinder's evolutionary history, and Figure 2-3 charts the cost
history of the AIM-9H Sidewinder to the current AIM-9X Sidewinder development
program. (Data Search Associates, 1997)
Missile User Operational Evolution and contractors
AIM-9B Navy/AF 1956 First operational Sidewinder.
Built by Ford and General
Electric.
AIM-9D Navy 1965 Advance AIM-9B. Built by
Ford and Raytheon.
AIM-9G Navy 1966 Same as AIM-9D, but with
addition of advance acquisition
mode. Built by Raytheon.
AIM-9H Navy 1970 Solid state version ofAIM-9G.
Built by Raytheon and Ford.
AIM-9L Navy/AF 1975 New guidance control section,
safe & arm device, and fuze.
Built by Raytheon and Ford.
AIM-9M Navy/AF 1981 New guidance and rocket
motor. Built by Raytheon and
Ford.
AIM-9X Navy/AF 2002 New guidance and maneuvering
capabilities. Built by Raytheon
and Ford.
Table 2-4, AIM-9 Sidewinder Evolutionary History
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Source: U.S. Missile Data Book, Data
Search Associates, November 1997
Figure 2-3
E. ACQUISITION REFORM STRATEGY
The previous sections described the DoD environment in terms of declining
budgetary pressures, modernization, and a military requirements culture. These
environmental forces influence participant's behaviors, which affect decisions regarding
costs. They also have imposed upon DoD a need to change the way it conducts business,
if it is to afford modern weapons. (DoD, QDR, 1997) Dr. Gansler (USD(A&T)), in
remarks from his keynote address to an Executive Acquisition Symposium, highlights the
need for change:
A major issue is how to pay, within a constrained budget, for required
weapons modernization. To do this, government must take full advantage
of the technologies and management lessons that U.S. commercial
industry has evolved over the last decade, and, weapons must be




The FY 1999 defense budget projects an increase in procurement spending, but
total defense spending remains flat through FY 2003. Dr. Gansler states that a
fundamental transformation in the way DoD does business is required to make this
happen. The following DoD vision statement is a mandate for change in the acquisition
community.
DoD will institutionalize business processes that facilitate timely delivery
of "best value" products and services that meet the warfighters' needs; and
an environment for continuous process improvement; while supporting the
nations social policies, protecting the public trust and fostering
development of an integrated U.S. national industrial and technology base.
(USD(A&T) Webpage, 1998)
Additionally, six acquisition reform goals outline what DoD is to achieve.
• Enhance the requirements determination process
• Improve the systems acquisition effectiveness
• Improve the procurement process
• Improve contract administration
• Improve government contract terms and conditions
• Change the culture (USD(A&T) Webpage, 1998)
For purposes of this thesis, I define acquisition strategy as the integration of the
vision statement and goals into one, overarching strategy. The new strategic direction is
succinctly summarized by Dr. Gansler' s remarks to the National Contract Management
Association. The "overall acquisition goal must be to do the job better, cheaper, and
faster." (Gansler, 1998) The change in acquisition strategy guides the entire process and
provides a road map on how to manage and control programs.
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2. Focus on Affordability
In the QDR preface, Secretary Cohen states that fiscal reality "focused our
attention on the need to reform our organization and the methods of conducting
business." (DoD QDR, 1997) The conclusion is that previous behavior-related cost
activities are no longer affordable. DoD realizes that it cannot continue to conduct
"business as usual."
Many of the proposed weapon systems look unaffordable (e.g. F-22, V-22, F/A-
18E/F, Joint Strike Fighter). For example, GAO concludes that DoD's aircraft
investment strategy may be unrealistic. Between FY 2000 and FY 2015 Defense
expenditures for aircraft, as a percentage of total DoD budget, will exceed the historical
average in all but one year (Figure 2-4). For several of those years the percentage will
approach the peak of Cold War era spending. (GAO/NSAID-97-88, p.2) GAO
concludes that because of historical cost growth in DoD programs, "if the additional
funding and the projected savings do not materialize as planned, DoD will face a
significant imbalance" between funding requirements and fiscal resources.
(GAO/NSAID-97-88, p.3)
25








3. Acquisition Reform Initiatives
The focus of DoD acquisition reform efforts is to make modernization programs
affordable. Initiatives include use of single process initiative, reduction in military
specification, use of Joint programs and commonality, logistics support reform, use of
commercial standards, regulatory waivers, contractor configuration control, and CAIV.
(DoDD 5000.2R, 1996)
DoD leadership has increasingly pointed to CAIV as one of its more important
acquisition reform initiatives. In a statement to the House Committee on National
Security on Defense Acquisition Reform, Dr. Kaminski, former Deputy Under Secretary
for Acquisition and Technology, commented,
Significant savings are possible. For new programs using CAIV from the
onset, savings on the order of 30-50% can be obtained. For existing
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programs in later acquisition stages, retrofitting CAIV concepts is
expected to produce savings on the order of 10-20%. (Kaminski, 1997)
F. STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTIES
DoD is attempting to change its acquisition strategy to meet modernization
requirements in a fiscally constrained environment, but uncertainties threaten the
implementation of acquisition strategy. The Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD
leadership, and recent GAO reports all acknowledge the presence of strategic
uncertainties, which threaten the plan to help fund modernization through cost savings
generated by acquisition reform.
The Quadrennial Defense Review identified technical risk in leading edge
development efforts, cost growth, and complex advanced programs as sources of
strategic uncertainty.
The technical risk and program uncertainty inherent in complex, leading-
edge development efforts lead to unavoidable growth in costs and
offsetting reductions in other programs. Complex, technologically
advanced programs all bear some risk of costing more than planned.
When unforeseeable growth in costs occurs, offsets from other programs
must be found, this in turn disrupts the overall modernization program.
(DoDQDR, 1997)
Donna Richbourg, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
Reform) identified the smaller economic base, differences in mission, and evolving
technologies as sources of strategic uncertainty. "We are actively pursuing actions that
will reflect cost effectiveness in all actions relating to modernization of DoD weapon
systems." (GAO-T/NSAID-98-31, p. 20)
In an effort to avoid potential uncertainties identified by the Quadrennial Defense
Review and Donna Richbourg, program managers are incentivized to start programs with
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overly optimistic cost, schedule, and performance baselines. (GAO-T/NSAID-98-123,
p. 17) An individual program faces continual uncertainty in the annual budget process
and forces the program manager to continually "sell" his program. (Gansler, 1991,
p. 148) The effect is to introduce further uncertainty into the process about the real cost
of a weapon system. As costs grow and programs become under funded, competition
among stakeholders for scarce resources increase. In an almost circular argument, rather
than cancel weapon programs as too costly, DoD stretches programs out, which further
increases unit costs. (GAO-T/NSAID-98-123, p. 15)
G. SUMMARY
The previous sections outlined forces in the DoD environment, which influence
behaviors and incentives, and lead to higher costs. Constrained budget pressures drive
federal budget authority and outlays for defense spending down. Programs are stretched
out rather than cancelled, and unit costs increase. The requirement to modernize defense
forces, as approved by the Quadrennial Defense Review, drives up appropriations for
weapon procurement. Modernization of weapons equipped with leading edge
technologies drive up unit costs.
Similarly, the military user's continued reliance on only the most technologically
advanced weapon systems drive costs up. This paradigm has created a culture among
military requirements officers, defense officials, and defense contractors, that
performance is more important than cost. Acquisition reform efforts, specifically CAIV,
attempt to address behavior-related activities that lead to higher weapon systems costs.
DoD's new acquisition strategy is to change the way of doing business and build
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implementation. If the processes, attributable to CAIV by DoD literature, are successful
in changing the behaviors and incentives that lead to higher costs, then modernization
may be affordable during a fiscally austere time. The next chapter describes DoD CAIV




III. COST AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter outlines CAIV definitions, objectives, cost reduction activities, and
CPIPT functions. Implementation of CAIV represents a departure from past DoD
practices and is an attempt to change the behaviors and incentives that lead to higher
costs. However, the existence of different CAIV definitions and cost reduction priorities
indicates that CAIV lacks a managerial framework to assist program managers in how to
think about it.
B. DEFINITION
The reader may not find one complete definition of CAIV, but rather many
definitions of CAIV. The DoDD 5000.1 defines CAIV as follows.
Cost must be viewed as an independent variable. Accordingly, acquisition
managers shall establish aggressive but realistic cost objectives for all
programs and follow through by trading off performance and schedule,
beginning early in the program (when the majority of costs are
determined), to achieve a balance set of goals, based on guidance from the
Milestone Decision Authority. (DoDD 5000.1, 1996)
Chapter I outlined Dr. Kaminski's definition of CAIV as a "strategy that uses the
best value approach." Additionally, the following samples from the literature
simultaneously describe CAIV as follows (italics are mine).
DoDD 5000.2R defines, "CAIV is a process that helps arrive at cost
objectives." (DoDD 5000.2R, 1996)
Dr. Conrow from DSMC writes, "the recent OSD cost as an independent
variable (CAIV) initiative takes a step in a different direction - it attempts
to address several key issues that lead to increased program cost and
schedule." (Conrow, 1996, p.48)
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Mr. B.A. Kausal IV from DSMC also writes, "the latest DoD initiative to
try and tackle this problem (affordability) is Cost As An Independent
Variable." (Kausal, 1996, p.22)
The Department of the Navy (DON) acknowledges existence of widely
varied CAIV definitions and, in addition to DoD policy, has issued its own
policy guidance. (Dalton, 1998) DON policy describes CAIV as a
"strategic management process" and as a "methodology for reducing total
ownership costs." (Dalton, 1998)
Dr. Rush from DSMC writes, "CAIV is a new DoD strategy that makes
total life-cycle costs as projected within the new acquisition environment a
key driver of system requirements." (Rush, 1997, p. 165)
Finally, Dr. Land from DSMC writes, "CAIV is an acquisition philosophy
intended to integrate proven successful, business-related practices with
new DoD initiatives to obtain superior, yet reasonably priced warfighting
capabilities." (Land, 1997. P.26)
Remarks made by Dr. Kaminski, former USD (A&T), at an Air Force acquisition
work force CAIV conference present still another definition of CAIV. (USAF CAIV
Conference, 1997) He emphasized that CAIV is meant to simulate the commercial
sector's use of target costing methodology inside DoD. Target costing is a strategic cost
management method used in product design that involves estimating a target cost for a
new product, then designing the product to meet that cost. Dr. Kaminski noted that
"CAIV involves the user, sustainer, and acquirer in looking for cliffs." (USAF CAIV
Conference, 1997) Five percent of the performance may be worth fifty percent of the
cost. He proposed that the financial departments get involved early and flip back and
forth between cost, performance, design, and schedule.
A program manager might conclude that implementing CAIV into programmatic
management is a difficult task since CAIV has so many definitions. Dr. Rush goes on to
say that CAIV suffers from too many initiatives to be easily explained. It is a philosophy,
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which combines all best practices affecting cost. (Rush, 1997) Although ambiguous
definitions of CAIV exist in DoD literature, a description of its objectives is clear, which
is the subject of the next section.
C. OBJECTIVES
Dr. Longuemare, former PDUSD(A&T), states the thrust of CAIV is to adapt
successful business practices that meet or exceed the military user needs, while meeting
specific, predetermined cost targets. (Longuemare, 1995) In the past, the Soviet threat
and available technology drove the acquisition process, and cost-performance tradeoffs
were not emphasized. (Longuemare, 1995) CAIV formalizes a process to facilitate cost-
performance tradeoffs that include the military user, contractor, and logistician as
participants. (Longuemare, 1995)
Although Dr. Rush states that "the central feature of CAIV is the tradeoff
process," the DoD CAIV working group report (1995) establishes a "broader context" for
CAIV. The working group report provides the "conceptual approach" to CAIV by listing
a set of objectives the program manager can "utilize and enlarge" upon in its
implementation. Program management should achieve the following objectives.
• Set realistic, but aggressive cost objectives early in an acquisition program
• Manage risks to achieve cost, schedule, and performance objectives
• Devise appropriate metrics in tracking progress towards achieving cost goals
• Motivate government and industry managers to achieve program objectives
• Put in place for fielded systems additional incentives to reduce operating and
support costs. (Longuemare, 1995)
The following subsections explain each of the objectives in more detail.
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1. Setting Aggressive Cost Objectives
The DoD CAIV working group report (1995) describes aggressively setting cost
objectives, ensuring projected out-year resources are balanced with mission needs, and a
willingness to trade-off operational performance to meet cost objectives as keys to a
successful CAIV program. The program manager sets cost objectives that are DoD-
equivalent of sound commercial business practices based upon costs of comparable
systems, mission effectiveness studies, technology based trends, and initiatives such as
lean manufacturing. DoDD 5000.2R (1996) states that the Cost-Performance IPT will
update the cost objectives during each phase of development to ensure realism is
balanced with aggressive cost objectives.
Setting aggressive cost objectives and a revitalized and more formal cost-
performance tradeoff process will motivate both government and industry
by clarifying objectives', fostering feedback, and empowering decision-
making at the lowest levels. (Longuemare, 1995)
2. Manage Risk
The working group stated in their report that a program must integrate any CAIV
implementation plan with a risk management plan. Attempting to achieve aggressive
cost objectives could increase program risk. A CAIV plan that uses mature technologies,
conducts cost/performance/schedule/risk tradeoffs, and identifies solutions to
manufacturing process uncertainties can decrease program risk.
DON CAIV policy states, "an unavoidable consequence of setting aggressive,
realistic cost objectives is an increase in risk". (Longuemare, 1995) Dr. Rush lists areas
of program management that is particularly important when attempting to decrease risk
during the implementation of CAIV.
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• Program budgets remain stable since they are critical under CAIV, where cost
explicitly drives performance and schedule.
• Operational requirements remain stable during system development and
production.
• Cost models can determine relationships between performance, mission
effectiveness, and cost, and the relationships are used in the tradeoff process.
• Historical cost database is applicable to accurately predicting the cost of the
current system.
• Technology develops as required to enable achievement of design and process
goals. (Rush, 1997, p. 147)
Although Dr. Rush lists several more areas of risk management, the above list is
applicable to the AIM-9X case study.
3. Incentives for Achieving Cost Objectives
Each acquisition program must incentivize government and contractor employees
to meet or exceed cost objectives. The CAIV working group suggests government
program managers establish an environment that promotes teamwork, goal setting, and
recognition of accomplishment from the management chain. For industry, the working
group acknowledges that current source selection practices put too much emphasis on
performance, with less emphasis given to reducing production and/or operations and
support costs.
DoDD 5000.2R (1996) now includes the following CAIV working group
recommendations. The Request for Proposal must provide incentives to the contractor to
meet or exceed cost objectives. Programs must maintain competition and let the business
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profit incentive work as long as practical. Program managers must use award programs
and shared savings programs to create incentives for the contractor to continue to reduce
costs throughout the life of a program. Finally, the contract approach will consider
incentive and award fee structures to decrease life cycle costs.
4. Metrics
Metrics and observables are needed for overall assessment of progress in applying
CAIV to an acquisition program. A system of quantitative measurements facilitates
oversight of CAIV implementation and management of achieving objectives. Table 5-1
provides a sample of metrics from the DoD working group report that program
management must consider when implementing CAIV.
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• Are cost objectives defined and
consistent with requirements
programmed and projected fiscal
resources?
Out-year resources ($) identified?
Production and operations and support cost
objectives included in the Request for Proposal?
- Key tradeoff issues addressed? (e.g., in
Analysis of Alternatives)
• Is DoD managing to achieve cost
objectives?
Request for Proposal contains a strict minimum
number of performance specifications? (#)
- Cost-Performance IPT functioning; tradeoff
space identified in program baseline and RFP?
- Risks to achieve cost objectives identified and
program steps to address these defined? (risk
plan)
- Incentives for achieving cost objectives
included in the Request for Proposal and
contract? (% relative to total contract $s)
- Mechanism for contractor suggestions to reduce
production and operations and support costs in
place and operating?
Allocation of cost objectives provided to IPTs
and key suppliers
- Measurement and estimation of reliability and
maintainability
Robust contractor incentives plan in place?
• Are contractors managing to achieve
cost objectives?
- Providing appropriate tools for cost-
performance tradeoffs (including incentives for
corporate management) and participates in cost-
performance tradeoff process
Identifying (and when appropriate implements)
new technologies and manufacturing processes
that can reduce costs
Identifying procedural/process impediments to
cost reduction measures
- Establishing strong relationship with vendor
base, including sound incentives structure
Table 3-1, Illustrative CAIV Metrics and Observables
Source: DoD CAIV Working Group Report (1995)
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5. Fielded Systems
The CAIV working group recommends program management establish awards
board to recognize proposals that would reduce total life cycle costs. The award board
would rank the proposals by return on investment, risk, and other considerations.
Program managers can achieve the objectives by employment of various cost
reduction activities described in the next section.
D. COST REDUCTION ACTIVITIES
According to the new DoD CAIV policy, cost is the key driver of performance
and schedule. Defense Systems Management College proposes a hierarchy of cost
reduction activities available for CAIV implementation. The following list presents
CAIV reduction activities in order of potential benefit.
• Cost/performance/requirements trades—considered the "essence" of CAIV
• Acquisition strategy—maintain competition as long as possible
• Systems engineering/Integrate Program and Product Development—integrate
all functional planning
• Contractor enterprise re-engineering—concentrate on core activities and
develop key suppliers for non-core activities
• Commercial specifications, practices, and components where technically
feasible. (Defense Systems Management College, 1997, p. 14-4)
The DON CAIV policy includes still another hierarchy of cost reduction
activities. (Dalton, 1998) The DON list is also presented in recommended order of
priority.
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• Analyses should be continuously performed to improve processes and
activities, and to eliminate non-value added and deficient cost-to-benefit
processes and activities. Value-based technology solutions should be
implemented throughout the life cycle to minimize cost.
• Requirements, which do not directly contribute to warfighter's needs, should
be scrutinized for relaxation during the Analysis of Alternatives and
throughout the life cycle.
• Tradeoffs that reduce cost while still meeting all operational requirements
should be conducted during the life cycle.
• Cost performance tradeoffs of user requirements resulting in a breach of the
operational requirement threshold are only to be accomplished as a last resort,
with agreement of the Milestone Decision Authority and Chief of Naval
Operations or Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The priority of cost reduction activities differs between DoD and DON, which
sends conflicting signals to program managers and can further weaken the
implementation process in DoD. According to DSMC the essence of CAIV is the
cost/performance/schedule tradeoff, whereas DON policy puts requirement trades as a
lower priority.
E. COST-PERFORMANCE IPT
The mechanism by which CAIV is implemented is through the formal
organization and activities of an acquisition program's Cost-Performance IPT.
(Kaminski, 1995) DoD has made IPTs an integral part of the defense acquisition
oversight and review process. (DoD Guide to IPPD, 1 996) Their purpose is to replace a
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sequential process of review and approval with a teaming concept. (DoD Guide to IPPD,
1 996) The following subsections describe the focus and responsibilities of IPTs, the




The purpose of IPTs is to facilitate decision-making by making
recommendations based on timely input from the entire team. Composition of IPTs
includes representation of all appropriate functional disciplines, which takes advantage of
their expertise, and enables a faster approval process during milestone review. (DoD
Guide to IPPD, 1996) IPTs operate under the following broad principles:
• Open discussions with no secrets
• Qualified, empowered team members
• Consistent, success-oriented, proactive participation
• Continuous "up the line" communications
• Reasoned disagreement
• Issues raised and resolved early (DoD Guide to IPPD, 1996)
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b) Hierarchy oflPTs
Hierarchies of IPTs exist for each acquisition program. (DoD Guide to
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management environment there exist the program IPTs, which are responsible for
program execution. At the next level, a series of working group IPTs exists that focus on
identifying and resolving issues, taking advantage of acquisition reform opportunities,
and planning for program success. Together the working group IPTs perform the
function of integrating all program information, issues, and resolutions geared towards
program success. Just below the Milestone Decision Authority, the Overarching IPT
provides strategic guidance and program assessment. Table 5-2 depicts the types and
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Table 3-2, DoD IPT Types, Focus, and Responsibilities
Source: DoD Guide to IPPD (1995)
Cost-Performance IPT
a) Functions
The Cost-Performance IPT is a working level IPT, which provides
oversight and review of an acquisition program. (DoD Guide to Successful IPTs, 1995)
According to DoDD 5000.2R, the Cost-Performance IPT must establish cost objectives
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for each element of program life-cycle cost: RDT&E, production, operations and support,
and disposal. Integrate and evaluate all cost-performance tradeoffs. Assess progress
towards meeting the cost objectives at each developmental milestone with the use of
quantifiable metrics. Implement incentives to encourage accomplishment of the cost
goals. (DoD Guide to Successful IPTs, 1995)
b) Cost-Performance IPTApproach
Although Cost-Performance IPT activities continue throughout the life of
a program, they focus on the principle that the best time to reduce life cycle costs is early
in the acquisition cycle by shaping requirements and proposed design changes. (DoD
Guide to Successful IPTs, 1995) The Cost-Performance IPT establishes cost goals
through consideration of projected out-year resources, recent unit costs, historical cost
analysis, mission effectiveness studies, cost-performance tradeoffs, and technology
trends. (DoDD 5000.2R, 1996)
Once established the program manager uses the cost goals as a
management tool. (Kaminski, 1995) For example, the program could structure Request
for Proposals and contracts to provide incentives to industry to meet the CAIV cost goals.
Source selection boards should base their decisions, in part, on a contractor's ability to
meet the cost goals.
The contractor then allocates the overall cost goals to specific sub-
components of the chosen weapon design. (Defense Acquisition Deskbook, 1997) The
contractor allocates a cost target to each sub-component and uses a system engineering
approach in designing the system to meet the cost goal.
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Team members are empowered by program management to recommend
performance and/or engineering and design changes as long as the threshold values in the
Operational Requirements Document are satisfied. (DoDD 5000.2R, 1996) If the
Operational Requirements Document threshold values require change, the program
manager is responsible for bringing the change before approval authorities for decision.
c) Cost-Performance IPT Membership
The program manager chairs the Cost-Performance IPT, which includes
representation from the user, OSD, and defense contractor communities. Specifically,
under the direction of the program manager the Cost-Performance IPT establishes cost
objectives and facilitates cost-performance tradeoffs through a continuous, interactive
















process with team members depicted in Figure 3-2. (Defense Systems Management
College, 1 997) The activities of concept and design, operational requirements, funding,
and program office migrate into one integrated team.
The program evaluation officer and other members of the OSD staff,
service acquisition executive and service headquarters staff participate by determining
funding availability, program priority, and programmatic direction. The contractor
provides design concepts, cost data, and cost analysis necessary to conduct cost-
performance tradeoffs. The military user provides requirements priority and input into
the trades. Members from the program office provide functional representation and
technical expertise.
d) Keys to an effective Cost-Performance IPT
The acquisition literature identifies keys to an effective Cost-Performance
IPT. First, a strong working relationship between the program manager and the military
user is essential to Cost-Performance IPT effectiveness. (Defense Systems Management
College, 1997, p. 14-6) In the absence of the military user the essence of CAIV—cost-
performance tradeoffs—could not happen. The Cost-Performance IPT could not shape
the operational requirement.
Second, "maximizing a Program Manager and contractor's flexibility to
make cost-performance tradeoff tradeoffs without unnecessary higher-level permission is
essential to achieving cost objectives". (DoDD 5000.2R, 1996) In other words,
flexibility, teamwork, and empowered decision-making are essential elements to an
effective Cost-Performance IPT. To aid the program manager's flexibility the number of
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threshold requirements shall be limited, and they shall represent warfighter minimums.
(DoDD 5000.2R, 1996)
F. SUMMARY
This chapter described CAIV in terms of its principles, objectives, cost reduction
strategies, Cost-Performance IPT functions, and its approach to implementing CAIV.
CAIV is operating in a DoD environment where participants' behaviors and incentives
require change. CAIV is an acquisition reform effort that addresses the behaviors and
incentives that lead to rising costs.
Dr. Gansler, current USD (A&T), wrote in 1980, "If DoD is ever going to reverse
the downward trend in amounts of equipment procured without enormous budget
increases, the only way to do it is to make cost a major criterion." (Gansler, 1980, p.278)
Cost appears to be a major criterion in the work that takes place in the Cost-Performance
IPT. The Cost-Performance IPT is a mechanism that attempts to control the user's
behavior, and, therefore, costs.
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IV. MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS AND CAIV
A. OVERVIEW
In this chapter I provide the framework to view OSD CAIV policy in terms of a
strategic management control system. I begin by defining the commercial industry
approach to management control systems, identifying the elements of a control system,
and discussing factors that can lead to the effective employment of a control system.
Then in contrast to the commercial approach, I describe the DoD approach to
management control systems, and identify the major difference between the two
approaches. The differences are key when thinking about CAIV as a strategic control
system.
B. MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
1. What is a Management Control System?
Simons' defines management control systems as "the formal, information-based
routines and procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns in organizational
activities." (Simons', 1995, p.5) Anthony states the purpose of a management control
system is the implementation of strategy. "Management control is the process by which
managers influence other members of the organization to implement the organization's
strategy." (Anthony, 1988, p. 10)
Euske uses Anthony's definition to emphasize that the function of management
control is to facilitate the accomplishment of organizational goals through the
implementation of identified strategies. (Euske, 1984, p.2) Merchant states that for
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purposes of designing a management control system, it is useful to have strategies that
are specific, detailed, and current.
Formal strategic statements make it easier for upper management both to
identify the feasible control alternatives and to implement them effectively.
The controls can be targeted to the organization's critical strategic factors,
such as developing new products, keeping costs down, or enhancing market
share. (Merchant, 1998, p.4)
Simons' management control levers drive strategic change and renewal and
address Merchant's concern about keeping strategy current. He introduces four levers of
control, which provide a framework for the evolution and implementation of strategy.
Strategic control is not achieved through new and unique systems but
through belief systems, boundary systems, diagnostic control systems, and
interactive control systems working in concert to control both the
implementation of intended strategies and the formation of emergent
strategies. (Simons, 1995, p.34)
Figure 4-1, and the following explanation, depicts Simons' framework of management
control levers.












Press, 1995, page 7.
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1.
A beliefs system is the explicit set of organizational definitions that
senior managers communicate formally and reinforce systematically to
provide basic values, purpose, and direction for the organization. Senior
managers want subordinates to adopt the values and direction. (Simons,
1995, p.39)
2. Boundary systems delineate the acceptable domain of activity for
organizational participants, and establish areas where risks are to be
avoided." (Simons, 1995, p. 59)
3. Diagnostic control systems are designed to ensure predictable goal
achievement. Three features distinguish traditional diagnostic controls
systems, a) the ability to measure the outputs of a process, b) the existence
of predetermined standards against which actual results will be measured,
and c) the ability to correct deviations. (Simons, 1995, p.95)
4. Interactive control systems are the formal information systems that
managers use to actively participate on a regular basis in decision
activities of subordinates. (Simons, 1995, p.97) The control system
focuses the entire organization on the area that managers choose.
Simons defines four characteristics of the interactive control system.
• Information generated by the system is an important and recurring agenda
addressed by the highest levels of management.
• The interactive control system demands frequent and regular attention from
operating managers at all levels of the organization.
• Data generated by the system are interpreted and discussed in face-to-face
meetings of superiors, subordinates, and peers.
• The system is a catalyst for the continual challenge, and debate of underlying
data, assumptions, and action plans. (Simons, 1 995)
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Through dialogue, debate, and learning new strategies emerge. (Simons, 1995,)
A control system is interactive if it triggers revised action plans. (Simons, 1995) Figure
4-2 depicts Simons interactive management control model.
Simons'
Interactive Management Control System Model
Senior Management Vision
Learning
Source: Simons, Robert, Levers of
Control , Harvard Business School Press,
1995, page 102.
Appendix A summarizes the "what," "why," "how," "when," and who," of the
four levers of control managers use to control the evolution and implementation of
strategy. Appendix A also includes a summary of the use of internal control systems,
which is not among the systems Simons, or any of the previously mentioned authors,
proposes that managers use to control the implementation of strategy.
2. Elements of a Management Control System
The previous section discussed management control in terms of implementing
strategy. Once an organization has formulated its strategy, it requires a control system to
implement strategy. What would a management control system look like? Table 4-1
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identifies specific elements and activities of that make up a generic management control
system.
Control Elements Control Activities
Plan organizational goals
Goals (or objectives) state what is to be
achieved and when results are to be
accomplished. (Mintzberg, 1996, p.3)
Communicate goals and objectives
Management control requires coordination
and communication among individuals
because all parts of the organization must
work together to achieve the goals and
objectives. (Anthony, et.al.,1992, p. 7)
Determine outputs and standards for
assessment
Specific elements ofperformance are
identified and incorporated into the control
system, and are consistent with organizational
goals and objectives. (Euske, 1984, p.3)
Detect information, activities, or
behaviors
Components of the control system, such as a
series of reports, or a management
information system, which detect information
for evaluation. (Euske, 1984, p.3)
Rewards, incentives, and sanctions
Rewards, incentives, and sanctions are
attached to this component of the control
system. (Euske, 1984, p.5)
Evaluate information about activities, or
behaviors against standards
Managers make decisions as to whether
differences in actual and standard
performance is significant enough to warrant
action. (Anthony, et al.,1992, p.7)
Initiate feedback to ensure organization
stays on strategic course.
Information flows back up to upper
management about progress in achieving
intended strategies. (Simons, 1995, p.6)
Table 4-1, Generic Management Control System
A management control system that consists of plans, standards for assessments,
evaluation, and feedback do not necessarily guarantee that an organization will achieve
its goals. An organization still must answer the question of how to get managers and
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subordinates motivated to move in the right direction and implement its strategy. The
next section discusses these factors to effective management control.
3. Factors in Effective Management Control
Management control is meant to achieve objectives, focus on results, and is
concerned with people who ultimately make an organization successful. (Euske, 1984,
p.2) However, the effectiveness of any management control system depends on a number
of factors. This section briefly discusses behaviors, incentives, and organizational
structure, culture, and direction as factors that effective management control.
a) Behaviors
Euske states that possibly the most important aspect of management
control is that it is concerned with people in organizations. (Euske, 1984, p.3) Anthony
et al. (1992) notes that the management control process is primarily behavioral. The key
to effective control is goal congruence, which matches the goals of managers, and their
subordinates, with organizational goals. (Anthony et al., 1992, p. 12) The control system
must control behavior to positively influence the outcome of organizational strategy, and
ensure organizational strategy stays on course.
Newman states that managerial control is effective only when it guides
someone's behavior. The purpose is not concerned so much with measurements and
reports, but changing behavior. (Newman, 1975, p.4) Newman's point is that the mere
existence of a control system does not determine its effectiveness. Anthony (1988) notes
that a control system is effective only if it changes behaviors in managers and
subordinates, and they become congruent with organizational goals. An organization's
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ability to achieve goal congruence is key to an effective control system and the
implementation of business strategy.
b) Incentives
In addition to the reward structure, positive and negative incentives
influence people in a way that furthers the goals of an organization.
,
(Anthony, et al.,
1992) Anthony et al. (1992) list a few incentives that are useful when examining DoD
implementation of CAIV:
• Senior managers must signal to subordinate managers that the management
control system is important
• Individuals are highly motivated when they receive feedback
• Motivation is weakest if the goals are too hard to obtain, or too easily
obtainable
• Incentives provided by budgets, or cost goals, is strongest
c) Culture
Since management control is fundamentally behavioral, the organizational
climate, or its culture, is another challenge to effective control. (Anthony, 1988, p.74) Is
the culture congruent with the organizational goals? An organization's management
control system may actually control more effectively, because its culture is a better fit
with the organization's strategy. (Anthony, 1988, p. 75) The culture may or may not
promote autonomy, teamwork, and empowerment. The culture may or may not be
resistant to change. (Anthony, 1988, p. 76)
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d) Structure
Mintzberg cites Andrew's model of corporate strategy, which highlight the
importance of organizational structure in achieving results. An organization's structure
must fit the task.
An organizational structure appropriate for the efficient
performance of the required tasks must be made effective by
information systems and relationships permitting coordination of
subdivided activities. (Mintzberg, 1996, p.49)
e) Direction
Finally, Merchant argues people may perform poorly, and not meet
expectations, simply because management has not provided direction. A control system
function involves informing employees how they can maximize their contributions and
meet organizational objectives. (Merchant, 1998) As Anthony already noted,
management control requires communication and coordination among all individuals in
the organization. Managers must provide and communicate the organization's strategy.
How does the preceding description of management control systems differ
from DoD use of control systems? The next section discusses Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) implementing directives, DoD directives, and program office use of
management controls.
C. MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN DOD
The use of management control in DoD begins from a broad federal government
perspective of management control, then narrows its scope to a DoD perspective of
management control, and finally to the use of management control in major defense
acquisition programs.
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The Federal Manager's Financial Integrity (FMFIA) Act of 1982, Chief Financial
Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-
123 dated 21 June 1995, establish the policy and framework for the use of management
control in the federal government.
DoDD 5010.38 dated 26 August 1996 and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5010.40 dated
28 August 1996 are the implementing directives for the use of management control.
1. Federal Definitions and Concepts
The FMFIA, CFO Act, and OMB A- 123 provide the Federal perspective on
management control. The FMFIA requires agency heads establish controls to ensure that
obligations and costs comply with applicable law, assets are safeguarded against fraud,
waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation, and revenues, and expenditures are
accounted for and properly recorded. The FMFIA requires the agency head submit an
evaluation report to Congress every year on the control systems in use and how they
protect the integrity of federal programs. The FMFIA Act encompasses program,
administrative, and operational areas as well as accounting and financial management.
The CFO Act requires the preparation and audit of financial statements of 24
federal agencies in order to improve control over an agency's financial activities. Since
the audit of financial statements require a report on the internal controls and compliance
with laws and regulations, the CFO Act should help federal agencies establish and
evaluate management controls. (OMB Circular A- 123, 1995)
OMB A- 123 Management Accountability and Control was issued under the
authority of FMFIA. It defines management controls as the organization, policies, and
procedures used to ensure that programs achieve their intended results, resources are
protected from fraud, waste, and mismanagement, laws and regulations are followed, and
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reliable and timely information is obtained. The OMB circular further defines
management controls as follows.
Management controls, in the broadest sense, include the plan of
organization, methods, and procedures adopted to ensure that its goals are
met. Management controls include processes for planning, organizing,
directing, and controlling program operations. A subset of management
controls are the internal controls used to assure that there is prevention or
timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, disposition of the
entity's assets. (OMB Circular A-123, 1995)
2. DoD Definitions and Concepts
a) DoD Directive 5010.38, Management Control Program
DoDD 5010.38 is the implementing directive for the DoD management
control program. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)) is the
implementing agency for the CFO Act, FMFIA Act, and OMB A-123 requirements. The
acts require submission of two compliance reports, the Statement of Assurance and
Report on Material Weaknesses, which the USD(C) is responsible for submitting to
Congress. DoDD 5010.38 defines effective management control policy as reasonable
assurance that the following is accomplished:
• Obligations and costs comply with applicable law
• Assets are safeguarded for fraud, waste, unauthorized use, and
misappropriation
• Revenues and expenditures are properly recorded and accounted for
• Programs and operating functions are carried out in accordance with
applicable law
• The management control process emphasizes prevention of waste, fraud,
mismanagement, and timely correction
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DoDD 5010.38 expands the scope of DoD management control policy
with the following statement. DoD organizations shall "address all significant operations
and mission responsibilities and not limit evaluations to the financial management
community." (DoDD 5010.38, 1996)
The directive requires the maintenance of system documentation for
management control programs. System documentation includes policies, procedures,
organizational charts, manuals, and flow charts to describe organizational structure,
operating procedures, and administrative practices to communicate responsibility for
accomplishing programs and activities.
b) DoD Instruction 5010.40, Management Control Program
Procedures
DoDI 5010.40 implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and defines
management control concepts and terms. It defines a control objective as a specific aim,
goal, condition, or level of control established by a manager of an assessable unit, such as
a program office. The instruction defines a control technique as any form of
organizational procedure or document flow that the program manager relies upon to
accomplish a control objective.
Of note, the update to DoDI 5010.40, August 1996, replaced the term
internal management control with management control. Managers use controls, such as a
system of reports, instructions, regulations, or procedures to carry out missions,
operational objectives to ensure programs achieve their intended results. (DoDI 5010.40,
1996) Management controls are an integral part of the planning, budgeting, management,
accounting, and auditing process and provide continual feedback. (DoDI 5010.40, 1996)
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3. Management Control in DoD Major Defense Acquisition Programs
DoDD 5000.1 identifies two acquisitions documents as meeting Federal and DoD
requirements for implementation of a management control program. The Acquisition
Program Baseline (APB) contains control objectives for a program's important cost,
performance, and schedule parameters. (DoDD 5000.1, 1996) The second document is
the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) report, which contains any
deviations from a program's APB and stated exit criteria. (DoDD 5000.1, 1996) Both of
these documents are used at the OSD level to monitor an acquisition program's goal
accomplishment.
Below the OSD level, program managers generate another set of program control
reports, and at still another level, defense contractors use their own management control
system, and any control systems' required by the government. The next section describes
this hierarchy of program controls.
a) Control at the OSD Level
The APB formalizes an agreement between the program manager and
OSD acquisition decision-makers by establishing an explicit set of desired outcomes.
Drezner and Krop, 1 997, p. 1 ) The APB contains a set of measurable goals, which allow
the OSD decision-maker, usually the Milestone Decision Authority, and the program
manager, to track a program's progress against the goals.
The APB contains only the most important cost, performance, and
schedule parameters. (DoDD 5000.1, 1996) Performance parameters designated as key
performance parameters by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council are lifted from the
user are Operational Requirements Document and included in the APB. (DoDD 5000.1,
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1996) The program manager proposes schedule parameters to include milestone decision
points, initial operating capability, and any other critical system events. Included in the
APB are RDT&E costs, Average Unit Procurement Cost (AUPC), total quantity, and any
other cost objective designated by the Milestone Decision Authority. If a program
breaches any one parameter, the Milestone Decision Authority can reevaluate a
program's design approach for continued development. (DoDD 5000.1, 1996)
The DAES is a status report prepared by the program office for OSD staff
personnel. (DoDD 5000.1, 1996) It highlights potential and actual problems a program
might experience before they become significant. Included in the DAES are a program
assessment, current estimates, and deviations from the APB parameters, unit costs, and an
assessment of the exit criteria. The program manager proposes exit criteria, which serve
as gates that must be passed or demonstrated prior to entering the next phase of
development or production. (DoDD 5000.1, 1996)
b) Control at the Program Office Level
Additionally, DoDD 5000.1 requires program office use of additional
reports to monitor program progress. Some of the reports are independent of the program
office's span of control. For example, the program office participates in the DoD
budgeting process to ensure no disconnect exists between resources planned by the
program office, and those that are programmed and allocated by the service chiefs.
Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E) reports, and Operational Test
& Evaluation (OT&E) reports are independent of the program office, but used to monitor
progress in performance parameter achievement. Independent cost estimates by the OSD
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Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) are used to monitor progress in cost
parameter achievement. (DoDD 5000.2R, 1996)
The program office uses of Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria
(C/SCSC), or Earned Value Management Systems (EVMS) internally. C/SCSC is a set
of standards for measuring the adequacy of a contractor's management control. (DoDD
5000.2R, 1996) It provides a framework, which consists of 32 criteria, to define work,
schedule, and budget to the lowest levels of the contractor's organization. EVMS is the
objective measurement of completed work and work in process for comparison with
planned and actual values for the same work. As work is performed, it is earned on the
same basis as it was planned, in dollars or other quantifiable units such as labor hours.
(Abba, 1997, p.60)
Another internal program office activity is development of a Work
Breakdown Structure (WBS). (DoDD 5000.2R, 1996) The program office, contractor,
and systems engineering personnel define the weapon system, then sub-divide the system
into subsystems or subcomponents (i.e. hardware, software, date, support, and services).
The contractor uses the WBS to report cost, performance, and schedule variances against
each of the identified subsystem components to the program office. (DoDD 5000.2R,
1996)
c) Control at the Contractor Level
An analysis of management control at the contractor level is beyond the
scope of this thesis, but a contractor must internalize C/SCSC, EVMS, and WBS into its
corporate management control systems in order to comply with government
requirements. DoD requires other reports that deal with contract management reporting,
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for example, Cost Performance Report, Contractor Cost Data Report, Cost/Schedule
Status Report, and Contract Funds Status Report. (DoDD 5000.2R, March 1996)
Additionally, items discussed earlier in the chapter, financial measures such as bonus
plans, compensation plans, profit plans, and non-financial measures such as quality
standards, training, team-building skills might also be a part of a contractor's
management control system.
Figure 4-3 summarizes a hierarchy of management control reporting
requirements at the OSD, program office, and defense contractor level.
Hierarchy of DoD Management
Control Reporting
Figure 4-3
D. DIFFERENCES IN DOD & COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT CONTROL
Fundamental differences exist between the commercial approach to management
control systems and the DoD approach to management control systems. First, the DoD
approach to management control appears to be narrowly focused on internal and financial
control systems, whereas the commercial approach ties control systems to the
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implementation of strategy. Despite USD(C) references to internal control systems as
being a subset of management control, the preponderance of DoD literature is concerned
with safeguarding assets, properly recording and accounting for revenues and
expenditures, and prevention of fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Simons states the
following about internal control systems.
Internal control systems are not among levers used by managers to control
strategy. They are, however, fundamental to ensuring the integrity of data
used in all other control systems. (Simons, 1995, p. 181)
Notably absent from the DoD approach to management control is its relationship
to the implementation of strategy. For example, absent from DoD literature is any
statement, such as the one cited by Anthony (1988) earlier in the chapter, linking strategy
to the control system. The process of management control influences managers to
implement the organization's strategy.
The lack of such a relationship could be a byproduct of the CFO Act and FMFIA
Act, since the Acts emphasize the protection of public goods and services from fraud,
waste, and mismanagement. Anthony (1988) implies other reasons.
In many types of non-business organizations, particularly government,
strategy formulation is especially unsystematic and difficult because
leaders have differing opinions about what the entity's goals should be, and
there is no rational way of resolving the differences. (Anthony, 1988, p.l 1)
Second, DoD uses the term management control program, whereas the
commercial approach uses the term management control system. The difference in
semantics is not a subtle one. From the preceding discussion a large number of
management control "programs" exist in a hierarchy of DoD management control
reporting. It does not appear that this large number of hierarchical control "programs,"
(e.g., contract reporting requirements, budgeting systems, and executive summary
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reports) are linked together to form one management control system that facilitates the
implementation of DoD acquisition strategy.
Andrew's concept of corporate strategy is a system. Formulation of strategy,
which is deciding what to do, and implementation of strategy, which is achieving results,
are tied together into one corporate system. (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1996, p.49) Simons
uses the term "strategic control" to identify effective control systems with the
"implementation of intended strategies and formation of emergent strategies". (Simons,
1995, p. 156) The linkage between strategy and control is not explicitly stated in DoD
instructions or guidance.
Third, it is not clear that the DoD management control program goes beyond
abstraction and actually identifies a framework of control elements, activities, rewards
and incentives, and how they are linked to strategy. In fact, an audit by the DoD Office
of the Inspector General concluded that the DoD management control program was
adversely impacted by the belief among many OSD and military department acquisition
personnel that management control was a "paper exercise," which applied only to
financial activities and property accountability. (DoDIG Report-96-028, p.7) Senior
acquisition officials provided no guidance to Program Executive Officers and program
managers on how to relate management control to the control structure for acquisition
programs. (DoDIG Report-96-028, p.7)
The commercial approach to management control systems focus on such factors
as behaviors, incentives, and organizational structure, culture, and direction that affect the
management control system. The literature on management control spends a great deal of
time on human behavior. The reward system, incentives, and culture are important
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aspects to an organization's ability to achieve goal congruence, (e.g. Anthony 1988,
Simons, 1996) Anthony (1988) notes that management control is behavioral and that
effective control aligns personal goals with organizational goals. DoD directives and
instructions lack this behavioral aspect in its approach to management control.
In summary, DoD approaches management control from a narrow financial
aspect, whereas commercial industry approaches management control from a strategic
perspective, which is the implementation of its strategy. A framework or strategic system
exists in commercial industry that is concerned with behavioral patterns, rewards and
incentives, organizational culture, structure, and strategic direction. In contrast to this
system approach, no evidence could be found in the DoD program approach that
integrated them into a single management control system. Table 4-2 lists the main points
from the preceding discussion.
DoD Approach to
Management Control
Commercial Industry Approach to
Management Control
• Focus on Internal Controls • Focus on implementation of Strategy
• Management Control "Program" • Strategic Management Control "System"
• Absence of a framework • Framework
V' "paper exercise" •S Tied to strategy
S hierarchy of programs, which must S Organizational structure
be implemented S Organizational behaviors and
incentives
S Organizational culture
Table 4-2, DoD and Commercial Approaches to Management Control
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E. SUMMARY
The commercial approach to management control is to integrate strategy, goals
and objectives, and specific control elements, or components of the management control
system, together into a single framework or system that is concerned with the
implementation of strategy. The system integrates behavioral patterns, rewards and
incentives, organizational culture, and organizational structure into a managerial
framework.
In contrast, the DoD approach to management control appears to focus on single
programs concerned with safeguarding assets and prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.
Even in DoD acquisition programs, where there is less concern with safeguarding assets
and prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse, little evidence exists that management control
systems are concerned with the implementation of strategy. The interrelationships within
the hierarchy of management control reporting do not appear to be well defined nor
linked into one system responsible for the implementation ofDoD acquisition strategy.
I propose that CAIV be viewed within the framework of a strategic management
control system much like in commercial industry. After describing the implementation of




V. AIM-9X CASE STUDY
A. OVERVIEW
The chapter describes how the AIM-9X program office implemented the OSD
CAIV policy and how it is presently utilized within the program office and the Raytheon






Government Cost Account Manager (GCAM)
Procurement Price Commitment Curve (PPCC)
Price as a Technical Requirement (PTR)
Figure 5-1 Source: AIM-9X Program Office
to reduce AIM-9X costs in order to implement the DoD affordability strategy. The AIM-
9X program puts cost on an equal footing with performance, and as Figure 5-1 illustrates,
there are a number of program office and contractor activities to reduce costs.
The chapter divides the case study into four main sections: program background,
organization, CAIV implementation, and cost savings. Central to the organization of this




The AIM-9X Sidewinder is currently in its E&MD stage of development.
Raytheon Missile Systems Company, Tucson, Arizona, is the AIM-9X developer and
manufacturer.
The AIM-9X program office awarded two eighteen-month Demonstration and
Validation (DEM/VAL) contracts to Hughes Missile Systems Company and Raytheon
Company in December 1994. (Longuemare, 1995) DEM/VAL was used to demonstrate
the potential capabilities of the contractor's prototype missile guidance systems and to
prepare preliminary designs for an all-up-round AIM-9X missile. (Longuemare, 1995)
In December 1 996, the DoD Milestone Decision Authority approved the AIM-9X
program to proceed into E&MD. (Kaminski, 1996) The program office awarded the
E&MD contract to Hughes Missile Systems Company. After contract award, Hughes
Missile Systems Company was bought by Raytheon Company and is now called
Raytheon Missile Systems Company. The E&MD contract includes full-scale
development, options for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) of lots 1-3, and a
commitment curve for the next four Full Rate Production (FRP) lots.
Navy and Air Force requirement officers project a combined purchase of 10,000
AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles over the life of the program. (Navy Budget Exhibit, 1998)
The program production schedule is depicted in Table 5-1
.
Fiscal year FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 To complete Total program
QTY 150 250 600 600 8400 10,000
Table 5-1, AIM-9X Production Schedule
Source: AIM-9X Single Acquisition Management Plan (1997)
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LRIP is scheduled to begin in FY 2000. Full rate production (FRP) is scheduled to begin
in FY 2003. Initial operational capability is expected in FY 2002.
2. Operational Requirements
a) Concept of Operations
U.S. Navy and Air Force fighter aircraft are armed with two types of air-
to-air missiles: the radar guided Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM), and the heat seeking, infrared-guided AIM-9 Sidewinder missile. If U.S.
fighters must employ an air-to-air missile against threat aircraft at beyond-visual range,
an AMRAAM missile is the weapon of choice.
If U.S. fighters are unable to employ an AMRAAM missile, and must
continue to within-visual range of threat aircraft, a "dogfight" between aircraft will occur.
The pilot will employ the heat seeking AIM-9 Sidewinder missile after obtaining
favorable positional advantage against the threat aircraft. The AIM-9 Sidewinder also
must exhibit "dogfight" capabilities to shoot down threat aircraft such as the ability to
launch at high off boresight angles, reject infrared countermeasures, and maneuver under
high G-forces.
b) Threat
In 1990 U.S. military planners discovered the Russian version of a visual-
range, "dogfight" missile, the AA-1 1 Archer. This missile is more capable than the U.S.-
built AIM-9M Sidewinder missile. (Dornheim, 1995, p.37) The AA-11 has better
maneuverability, infrared countermeasures capability, and can launch at much greater off
boresight angles than the AIM-9M Sidewinder. (Dornheim, 1995, p.38)
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Navy and Air Force planners wrote the AIM-9X Operational
Requirements Document in response to the AA-1 1 threat. (Dornheim, 1995, p.38) The
program's objective is the development of a short-range air-to-air missile, which allows
U.S. aircraft to regain air superiority in a visual "dogfight." (Dornheim, 1995, p.38)
With the concept of operations and threat as a backdrop, Navy and Air
Force users identified the following five operational requirements as key performance
parameters:
• Operations in day and night
• Capability to launch at high off boresight angles
• Capability to track through Infrared Countermeasures
• Interface with multiple U.S. fighter aircraft
• High Probability of Kill (AIM-9X SAMP, 1997)
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C. PROGRAM GOALS AND ORGANIZTION
1. AIM-9X Goals and Objectives
The program's goals and objectives are stated as exit criteria in the AIM-9X
Acquisition Decision Memorandum. To enter LRIP the program must successfully meet
the following exit criteria.
• Demonstrate Key Performance parameters and APB threshold reliability and
maintainability requirements are achievable through a combination of
development test and analysis.
• Analyze cost experience and price projections to confirm the ability to
produce AIM-9X missiles at the price established in the LRIP contract.
• Demonstrate critical manufacturing processes using manufacturing capability,
factory transition, and design stability metrics. (Kaminski, 1 996)
Appendix B contains the full text of exit criteria for LRIP and FRP.
In addition to the goals and objectives, the program office and contractor have the
following joint mission statement, which helps guide behavior of government and
contractor personnel.
Our contractor/government team will deliver to the warfighter an
affordable AIM-9X weapon system that meets stated performance
requirements within schedule. (Smith, 1998)
2. Program Office IPT Structure
An IPT structure dominates AIM-9X program management and organization. In
the DEM/VAL stage, the program manager required Hughes and Raytheon to establish,
implement, and document systems engineering processes to include the formation of
IPTs. (DoDIG Report-97-064, p. 5) The IPTs teamed government and contractor
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representatives, to conduct formal and informal technical reviews, establish working
groups, and exchange information, which expedited completion of the contracts. (DoDIG
Report-97-064, p.5) Additionally, program management required the contractors to
prepare monthly status reports evaluating the effectiveness of the cost, performance, and
schedule of each IPT. (DoDIG Report-97-064, p.5)
In preparation for the E&MD phase, the program manager completely retooled
the program office organization into an IPT structure as depicted in Figure 5-3. Major
*j» AIM-9X Program Office IPT
Ss£ Structure
Program Management IPT
Affordability IPT Software IPT IMP/IMS IPT









Figure 5-3 Source: AIM-9X Program Office
program management functions were replaced by the weapon integration, missile system,
system validation, and operations and support IPTs, including a number of sub-IPTs,
which exist within the program management IPT. The Affordability IPT is an example
of a sub-IPT within the program management IPT. All IPTs include government and
contractor personnel.
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AIM-9X program management officials oversee IPT progress via daily contact
with the IPTs, monthly cost and schedule reports, affordability and producibility metrics
evaluation reports, design reviews, and program status reviews. (AIM-9X SAMP, 1997)
3. Cost-Performance IPT
In accordance with the DoD Rules for Leading Successful IPTs (1995), and as
previously discussed in Chapter III, the AIM-9X Cost-Performance IPT plays an
important role in the CAIV process. Key stakeholders on the Cost-Performance IPT are
the OSD cost estimator, OSD program assessment representative, the OSD Overarching
IPT coordinator, AIM-9X program manager and his functional representatives, and the
Navy and Air Force users. (MacKenzie, 1998) In the earlier stages of program
development the IPT felt compelled to frequently convene in order to determine the
nature of cost-performance tradeoffs and cost reduction activities. The Cost-Performance
IPT was instrumental in approving the contract incentive plan, award fee plan,
producibility and affordability metrics, and cost-performance tradeoffs. (MacKenzie,
1 998) As the program has matured in its current E&MD phase the Cost-Performance IPT
is not compelled to convene as often. (MacKenzie, 1 998) The team responsible for daily
execution of cost reduction activity is the Affordability IPT.
4. Scope of the Affordability IPT
The scope of cost reduction activities by the Affordability IPT goes beyond
recommending cost-performance tradeoffs. As discussed previously, DoD CAIV policy
outlines several CAIV objectives, all of which are instrumental in holding down costs.
The Affordability IPT mission statement is "to recommend to program management
opportunities for reducing costs during all life cycle phases of the AIM-9X missile, from
initial product development through disposal." (Goldstein, 1998) The participation of all
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appropriate functional and management personnel whose expertise lies within the scope
of the activities depicted in Figure 5-4, allows the IPT to provide program management














Figure 5-4 Source: AIM-9X Program Office
5. Working Environment
Although I cover in detail the implementation of CAIV in the next section, it is
worth noting here the change in working environment for government and contractor
personnel. Wade Smith, the Raytheon AIM-9X program manager, remarked about the
change.
What has really made the difference in the environment is that since
E&MD award we have really created a teaming relationship between the
government and contractor. We are working closely together and have a
common mission statement, a common set of goals. We as a team sat
down and explained what each of the goals meant to our personnel. The
leadership from the government has helped facilitate a different paradigm,
a different set of behaviors, such that we are always looking to the
warfighter's best interests in the most cost effective way. (Smith, 1998)
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D. IMPLEMENTATION OF CAIV
OSD outlined CAIV objectives in its 19 July 1995 and 04 December 1995
memorandums, which I covered in an earlier chapter. In addition to cost-performance
tradeoffs, OSD identified aggressive cost goals, metrics, incentives, risk management,
and reduction of operational and support costs as other CAIV objectives. The following
section discusses how AIM-9X program management achieved each of these objectives.
1 . Cost-Performance Tradeoff Process
Since the incorporation of CAIV into the AIM-9X program in December 1995,
the cost-performance tradeoff process has evolved from a series of early round table
discussions between the contractor, the program office, and the user into a formal
Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) process. This section outlines the program's cost-
performance tradeoff process and how it has evolved during program maturation.
a) User Participation
The user was involved early in the tradeoff process, even before OSD
released its CAIV policy memorandum in July 1995. Prior to DEM/VAL, a Navy and
Air Force Studies and Analysis group conducted an independent AIM-9X Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA). The purpose of the COEA was to consider
a wide range of missile design options to meet user requirements, identify key
performance parameters, and include the cost of each design option. (AIM-9X COEA,
1994) It indicated that air superiority could be achieved by upgrading the missile
seekerhead and integrating a more maneuverable, nimble airframe with existing AIM-9M
components. (AIM-9X COEA, 1994)
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From the author's experience during a Joint Tactical Air-to-Air Missile
Office Three-Star panel of Navy and Air Force requirement officers, and acquisition
officials, determined from the COEA results, that the AIM-9X program should use rocket
motors, warheads, and target detectors from the existing AIM-9M Sidewinder inventory.
The cost of developing, testing, and producing these new components for the AIM-9X
were avoided. 3
During DEM/VAL, OSD initiated its implementation of CAIV and
designated AIM-9X as a flagship program. After this designation, the program office
tasked Raytheon and Hughes, the two DEM/VAL contractors, to conduct a review of the
AS-5780 System Requirements Document. 4 The review enabled the contractor to
identify those areas in the System Requirements Document it felt were cost drivers, and
that the user might relax to achieve cost savings. The program office presented the
results to Navy and Air Force users for approval. Afterwards, the results were presented
to the Cost-Performance IPT, again with Navy and Air Force user participation, for final
approval. (MacKenzie, 1998)
In both instances the user was willing to give up performance in exchange
for cost savings. The user's decision resulted in Navy and Air Force controllers reducing
3
I distinguish between cost savings and cost avoidance, in that, cost savings is the reduction of already
programmed fiscal resources from the DoD Future Years Defense Plan, whereas cost avoidance is the
decision to forego any requirement to plan, program, and budget fiscal resources into the DoD Future Years
Defense Plan.
^ From the author's experience the AS-5780 is a program office document, which the acquisition
community often refers to as the "spec," or military specification. The program manager includes in the
AS-5780 all threshold and objective values from the user's Operational Requirements Document.
However, program managers can, and often do, attach additional value to selected threshold requirements,
and use them as a margin of error in design or testing. Since it is the AS-5780 on contract, defense
contractors must design to the "spec" requirements, and not the Operational Requirements Document
requirements, which shrinks opportunities for cost-performance tradeoffs.
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budgeted resources from the AIM-9X program, and reprogramming those resources into
other high priority weapon programs. The user approved eight changes to the
Operational Requirements Document, which included, for example, changes to Built-in-
Test reprogramming time, software language requirements, missile launch timeline
sequence, and missile cool down time. (Gaddis, 1 996) The amount of cost savings is
discussed later in the chapter.
As stated previously, the AIM-9X program is currently in its E&MD
phase with one contractor. Again, the nature of the CAIV tradeoff process has changed
with program maturation. The range of options for cost-performance tradeoffs is
narrower in the E&MD phase. (MacKenzie, 1998) The contractor is now building end
items, and the occurrence of technical problems can negatively impact system
performance and cost. If a problem does occur, the user must decide how important the
performance requirement is, and if it warrants an increase in budgeted resources to fix the
problem. The AIM-9X program manager commented on the changing nature of CAIV
tradeoffs in the E&MD phase.
Now that we have one contractor, CAIV takes on a different face,
almost more of a cost avoidance face perhaps, than cost savings. If
we run into a technical problem, which may impact the performance
of the system, the user must be willing to compromise on that
requirement or ask us to fix it. But that technical fix is going to cost
more in development and production. CAIV then, takes on an
almost negative connotation -I'm taking away performance to
maintain cost, rather than taking away performance to gain savings.
(MacKenzie, 1998)
b) Affordability IPT Cost-Performance TradeoffProcess
The Affordability IPT has formally incorporated the CAIV trade-off
process as part of its daily functions. Major Bruce Goldstein, USAF, the Affordability
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IPT lead, explains how the program implements CAIV in two ways. The IPT "provides a
focus and a forum." (Goldstien, 1998)
Management on both sides (government and contractor) must
focus on looking at tradeoffs. The key is to have all your folks
think it is okay to recommend performance changes if there is an
associated reduction in production costs. That is a big change in
the environment. Any cost reduction idea will be considered in
order to meet the cost goal. (Goldstien, 1998)
The Affordability IPT provides the forum for its team members to
recommend and initiate cost-performance tradeoffs by the incorporation of a new CAIV
ECP category. Major Goldstein explained the new ECP category.
The new category of ECP changes are now incorporated into
Raytheon's integration plan. It brings the process to the top level
of management. People are looking at engineering changes that
they consider cost-performance tradeoffs as technical change.
(Goldstien, 1998)
As depicted in Figure 5-5 the CAIV ECP process begins with an IPT team
member proposal, which detail system performance, contract, and life cycle cost impacts.
After a Program Analysis Team reviews and approves the change, it is then forwarded to
the AIM-9X program office and its Management IPT. After the Management IPT
reviews and approves the CAIV proposal, it is presented to the user and the Cost-
Performance IPT. Once approved by the Cost-Performance IPT, the user makes the
required changes to the Operational Requirements Document. User coordination and
concurrence is required for every CAIV ECP proposal.
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Figure 5-5 Source: AIM-9X Program Office
At the July 14, 1998 CAIV Flagship Update Working Group, Major
Goldstein briefed two success stories using the process just described. The first success
involved reduced production costs of aerodynamic missile surfaces. The IPT
recommended to the user relaxing the operational requirement for kinematic range in
certain areas of the maneuvering envelope. The cost-performance tradeoff allowed the
contractor design team to increase the leading edge thickness to fixed and movable
control surfaces, which saved the program $800 in production costs per missile, and $8
million in total program production costs.
The second success involved avoiding the cost of developing, testing, and
integrating new guidance and control system software to meet a user requirement to
launch the missile in accordance with a specified timeline after trigger squeeze. The user,
again, was able to relax the timeline requirement, which allowed the contractor design
team to avoid significant costs.
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c) Trade Space
Chapter III discussed the cost-performance tradeoff process as one of the
more important CAIV objectives. The user's Operational Requirements Document lists
performance parameters in terms of thresholds, which is a minimum acceptable value that
must be met to satisfy a mission objective. The Operational Requirements Document
also lists an objective value for each parameter, which represents a beneficial increase in
performance and mission capability. Trade space exists between the threshold and
objective values. Additionally, the user categorizes each performance parameter as either
a Key Performance Parameter or non-Key Performance Parameter (KPP). Whether or
not trade space exists below threshold values, in particular, below threshold values
designated for KPPs is a matter of conjecture and debate. This issue is discussed in more
detail in Chapter VII.
During pre-DEM/VAL, the number of available missile design options
considered in the COEA analysis determined the definition of trade space. (MacKenzie,
1998) From the available design options, the COEA determined the most cost-effective
solution in meeting the user's requirement for a next-generation AIM-9 Sidewinder. The
COEA also determined the user's threshold and objectives values for each performance
requirement (KPPs and non-KPPs), that are contained in the Operational Requirements
Document.
During DEM/VAL, the program manager placed a significant restriction
on the contractor's review of cost drivers in System Requirements Document. The
program manager considered those operational requirements, which the user designated
as KPPs, as off limits in the review process. (AIM-9X CAIV plan, 1 997) The contractor
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could review all non-KPPs for possible relaxation to achieve cost savings. The restriction
was a defacto definition of trade space.
From the author's experience, it was a decision strongly supported by the
Navy and Air Force requirement action officers. From a user perspective, the KPPs are
the essence of the AIM-9X modification program. The KPPs are required to defeat the
AA-1 1 threat, and are the sole reason the program existed in the first place. From the
author's experience, relaxation of KPP threshold values was viewed as a threat to
program survivability in the DoD budget process.
In the program's current E&MD phase, another perspective emerges on
trade space. The missile will ultimately undergo an independent Operational Test &
Evaluation (OT&E). (MacKenzie, 1998)
Threshold plus some margin is desired to pass OT&E, because of
the statistical uncertainty surrounding the threshold value. You
could fall a little bit short or a little over depending on the
sampling technique. (MacKenzie, 1 998)
It appears the effect of increased margin is to limit trade space between the
threshold value and the objective value, but at the same time it decreases risk to
the program manager that his weapon might fail Test & Evaluation.
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Figure 5-6 summarizes the main points regarding the cost-performance tradeoff
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d) Setting Aggressive Cost Objectives
This section describes the process by which the program office and contractor
established aggressive cost objectives. Since production costs traditionally account for
60-70 percent of total life cycle costs for air-to-air missiles, the AIM-9X program uses
missile Average Unit Procurement Cost (AUPC) as its cost objective. (MacKenzie,
1 998) The government and contractor management team spends a large amount of time
focused on meeting the AUPC cost target, which is set forth in the contract. (MacKenzie,
1 998) This section describes how the contractor manages its AUPC cost target, and the
linkage between AUPC management and the use of cost models.
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e) AUPC
During DEM/VAL, the contractors met quarterly with the program office
for the purpose of establishing cost targets for AIM-9X production. Both contractors
proposed to the program office that an AUPC goal, defined as the cost of the 5000th
production unit, be established as the cost target, and made part of the E&MD/LRIP
contract language. The AUPC cost target became the contract cost targets for award fee
computations. (MacKenzie, 1998)
The contractors took a systems engineering approach to establishing cost
targets in that cost estimators, production engineers, manufacturing engineers, systems
engineers, business and financial managers, and program management participated in the
quarterly meetings. (MacKenzie, 1998) Afterwards, both DEM/VAL contractors
included their AUPC cost target, and individual cost targets for each of the first three
LRIP production lots in their contract proposal. (MacKenzie, 1998)
f) AUPC Cost Management
Once the government and contractor signed an agreement on the AUPC,
Raytheon developed a cost management system, which allowed the AUPC cost target to
flow down to lower levels of management. (Smith, 1998) Figure 5-7 depicts how the
cost target flows down to separate work activities.
83
% AUPC Cost Management
Allocation of Cost Objectives






























Cost Acct Description Notional Amount
Bill Optics $125






Figure 5-7 Source: AIM-9X Program Office
The Raytheon AIM-9X program manager, and chief engineer, assigns
technical requirements, as well as a cost requirement, to each separate work activity, or
design team. (Smith, 1998) Each design team knows what upper management is
expecting from them in terms of performance and cost. Management assigns ownership
of a performance requirement and a cost requirement to each design team. Wade Smith,
Raytheon AIM-9X program manager, explains further how this cost management
strategy works in practice.
At each Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review,
each team has to brief their design, but they also have to talk about
producibility, manufacturing processes - are these processes in
hand or do they have to be invented? - and what is their estimate of
the cost. If they couldn't justify their cost or performance they had
to go back and do more work. Because of this very, very
disciplined focus on not only performance, but also cost, we have
great assurance what this product is going to cost. (Smith, 1998)
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Besides the cost management advantages of an AUPC breakdown, Wade
Smith also pointed out that each team can identify CAIV opportunities as it is
"wrestling" with its performance and cost requirements. If a team does have a
performance problem, which affects schedule or other design decisions, with the
respective cost implications, a CAIV opportunity exists to modify the requirement.
(Smith, 1998)
Then we can go back to our government team members and say,
understand the warfighter needs this, but here are the cost
implications of doing that. Do we really need that requirement or
can we modify it a little? So by flowing down the requirement and
cost to each team, that's where we raise CAIV issues. So I think
that CAIV issues are an outgrowth of having cost be considered
the same as performance at the design level. (Smith, 1998)
g) Use ofCost Model
The Raytheon has integrated its cost model down to all levels of the
contractor development team. Management empowers each design team to take
ownership of their cost requirement, and to use the model to study the cost implications
of their design decisions. (Smith, 1998) As a design team studies different design
approaches to achieving their performance requirement, they can model the cost
implications of each approach. It encourages "what if' analysis and ensures real time
production cost estimates early in the design process. (Goldstien, 1998) Cost modeling
is a design requirement instead of a financial reporting tool.
In the past the designers gave the end product to the cost estimator.
Now each design team owns its share of the cost model and is
aware of the cost goals. (Goldstien, 1998)
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Wade Smith stated that Raytheon's cost modeling approach forces the
design teams to consider alternative design options, for example, manufacturing
processes, parts, suppliers, and materials. Raytheon management now holds its teams
accountable and responsible for meeting their AUPC cost target. (Smith, 1998)
Management has given ownership of the cost model to each design team, and their use of
the models early in the design process is a key factor in meeting cost goals. (Smith,
1998)
Major Goldstein described the "philosophical change in the approach to
design between Price as a Technical Requirement and Design to Cost." (Goldstien,
1998) Formerly, cost reduction efforts began after product design under the Design to
Cost approach, whereas cost goals for each subsystem are set from the beginning of
design work under the Price as a Technical Requirement approach. Since each engineer
and designer has access and input into production cost modeling tools, they are expected
to meet their cost goal. It is now considered a technical requirement. The cost goal is a
result of an integrated government-contractor team analysis. (Goldstien, 1998) The
difference between Price as a Technical Requirement and Design to Cost is summarized
in Figure 5-8.
Raytheon trained key government personnel to use its cost model in order
to achieve consistency in cost estimates. The AIM-9X program office assigns a
government cost account manager for each Raytheon cost account manager to facilitate
communication on cost issues, and provide a "bottom to top" analysis of contractor
progress using the same tools. (Goldstien, 1 998)
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Figure 5-8 Source: AIM-9X Program Office
The cost model has evolved during program maturation, although at a
more rapid pace than usual because of the focus on costs shown by the AIM-9X program
office early in the program. (Smith, 1998) Prior to DEM/VAL, Hughes did not have a
cost model for the AIM-9X Sidewinder. Estimates of costs were generated by rules of
thumb, analogy to other processes and programs, and crude assessments. (Smith, 1998)
During DEM/VAL development of a detailed cost model became a high contractor
priority because of the intense government interest in affordability . (Smith, 1 998) The
AIM-9X Milestone IV/I Acquisition Decision Memorandum specifically directed the use
of contractor cost models to improve cost-performance tradeoff methodologies.
Development and deployment of the cost model down to the lower levels of design
responsibility became essential. (Smith, 1998)
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We wanted to make sure all the teams behaved in the same way.
So we put out program instructions, briefings, meetings, and told
people these are the rules to live by. Mainly, cost is an integral
part of the design process. (Smith, 1998)
The cost model currently in use by Raytheon is essential to CAIV, because
"a detailed cost model is required to make cost-performance tradeoffs." (Smith, 1998) It
is a way to get engineers to "think CAIV." (Smith, 1998) The Affordability IPT meets
quarterly to refine the cost model. The model receives data from negotiated subcontracts
and vendor agreements, data from updated production floor metrics, and data from more
current overhead rates. The IPT then uses the updated cost model to update the AUPC
cost target, update individual production lot cost targets, and examine cost-performance
tradeoffs. (Smith, 1998)
Just as the use of a detailed cost model is linked to meeting the AUPC cost
target, producibility metrics are also a key determinant in meeting the AUPC cost target.
The AIM-9X Acquisition Decision Memorandum also required development the
development of quantifiable producibility metrics, which is covered in the next section.
2. Metrics
The AIM-9X Statement of Work states that the objectives of the E&MD phase of
development is to enter into production with a stable design, gain a high confidence that
production processes work at maximum rate conditions, and achieve throughputs and
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Figure 5-9 Source: AIM-9X Program Office
capability, manufacturing risk assessment, design stability, factory transition—are used to
evaluate, track, and report progress towards meeting these objectives (Figure 5-9) 5
The AIM-9X Statement of Work defines each of the producibility metrics. The
contractor reports on manufacturing capability, which certifies AUPC, production rate,
and product design requirements can be met. Manufacturing risk assessment is the
evaluation of transition from development to production and the risks associated with the
transition. Design stability indicates design maturity. Factory transition measures the
progress in developing full rate production facilities. The quantifiable producibility
metrics are monitored with monthly program management and operations process
reviews. Factory level controls are monitored daily. Major Goldstein explained how
producibility metrics are flexible and evolves with the program.
* In fact, producibility metrics are so important to the program, they are included in the AIM-9X
Acquisition Decision Memorandum as exit criteria or gates. The program office must successfully
demonstrate achievement of the exit criteria prior to passing into the production phase.
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We continually look at the metrics for validity. Are they still valid? Do
we need to measure them any more? Are we getting valid data and do we
need to change them? (Goldstien, 1998)
The Affordability IPT has created another metric designed to drive down the
average unit cost (AUC) for the first three production lots. Whereas AUPC is defined as
the cost of the 5000 unit and is part of the E&MD contract, AUC is defined as the
average cost of one production lot. The Affordability IPT established a joint
government-contractor management goal of lowering the "Tl" price, which is the
average cost of the first production lot, by an additional 10 percent. (Goldstien, 1998)
Although the goal is not a contract item, it provides the team another metric to measure
program success. (Goldstien, 1998)
3. Incentives
The incentive to participate in the implementation of CAIV is different for the
defense contractor, the government program office, and the user. This section explains
the difference in incentives between the three groups.
a) Contractor Incentives
The program office used several methods to provide contractor incentives
to reduce costs. First, in DEM/VAL the incentive to aggressively set lower cost goals
was clearly the competition between Hughes and Raytheon to win the E&MD contract.
(AIM-9X CAIV plan, 1997)
Second, the cost plus incentive/award fee contract structure offers
significant incentives to Raytheon. It allows the program office to financially reward
Raytheon if they can meet the producibility and affordability criteria for its product,
while meeting performance requirements. (Goldstien, 1998) The contractor can receive
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an award fee of as much as 1 2 percent of the E&MD contract target cost, if they meet





• Reliability (MacKenzie, 1998)
The contract also includes options for the first three LRIP production lots,
which the program office may or may not choose to exercise depending on contractor
performance. The options are fixed price incentive fee, with a 0/100 share ratio. (AIM-
9X SAMP, 1998) This allows Raytheon to keep 100 percent of the savings if they fall
below the contracted prices set for LRIP lots 1-3. Lower production prices yields larger
profits for the contractor.
Third, a contractor-established outyear commitment curve, called a
Procurement Price Commitment Curve (PPCC) for full rate production lots 4-7 (see
Figure 5-10), provides an incentive for Raytheon to continue its cost reduction efforts.
(MacKenzie, 1998) The PPCC represents the contractor's estimate for the average unit
cost of the lots to be produced. Although the program office has not yet identified share
ratios for lots 4-7, as long as Raytheon prices come in below the PPCC, chances are they
will continue to produce AIM-9X with a sole source government contract. (MacKenzie,
1998)
Lastly, during source selection for E&MD the program office provided
incentives to the contractor to reduce life cycle costs. Traditionally, programs have
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treated development and production costs as more important than life cycle costs.
(MacKenzie, 1998) During E&MD source selection, the program weighted life cycle
costs as equally important as the E&MD and LRIP contract costs. (AIM-9X CAIV plan,
1997)
Figure 5-10 list positive contractor incentives in region A below the
PPCC, which include sole source production, contractor configuration control, a
government waiver of cost and pricing data, and development of a contractor missile
maintenance depot. Contractor disincentives listed in region B above the PPCC include a
competitive alternative, government configuration control, and financial penalties.
During FRP of lots four and beyond, the program office envisions value-engineering
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b) Government Program Management Incentives
Program management incentives to participate in CAIV are from three
levels. From an external level, USD(A&T) directed all "Flagship" acquisition programs
to implement CAIV. DoDD 5000.1 now directs all Acquisition Category I programs to
implement CAIV. DON direction now includes the implementation of CAIV into
Acquisition Category II programs as well.6
At a program office level, the incentive to participate in CAIV comes from
its contribution to greater program stability and less uncertainly about funding. CAIV
has helped "prevent requirements creep" from occurring in the AIM-9X program, which
has led to a stable design process. (MacKenzie, 1998) From the program manager's
perspective,
Requirements creep comes from the traditional users, OT&E
community, and contractor. Since the program has already turned
money back in to its Navy and Air Force resource sponsors, it
makes it hard for users, or the OT&E community, to add
(additional) requirements into the missile design. I know exactly
what I have money for and what I'm on contract to do. And I'm a
much more stable player in the budget process. (MacKenzie,
1998)
The program has experienced minimal destabilizing pressures to stretch
out its development schedule, which leads to higher life cycle costs, nor has it
experienced any significant pressure to incur a budget cut, which would lead to a longer
development schedule, and increased costs. (MacKenzie, 1998)
" DoDD 5000.2R (1996) classifies a program as Acquisition Category I ifRDT&E expenditures exceed
$355 million (FY1996 dollars) or procurement exceed $2,135 billion (FY1996 dollars). A program is
classified as Acquisition Category II if RDT&E exceed $140 million (FY1996 dollars), or procurement
exceed $645 million (FY 1996 dollars), but less than Acquisition Category I totals.
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Additionally, since contractor profit is no longer a percentage of revenue,
but based on a 0/100 share ratio of lowered production costs, the contractor does not have
an incentive to add "bells and whistles" to the product. In the past, the contractor could
use requirements creep to drive up revenue and profit, then convince the user to pay for
it. (MacKenzie, 1998)
From the point of view of the program manager CAIV does increase risk
in at least one area.
Incentives for the contractor are easy because there are many ways
to influence a contractor's bottom line or his profit. Incentives for
the government side is a little harder to define because CAIV by its
very nature attempts to streamline the process and cut out extra
time. But the acquisition community views extra time as risk
mitigation. You know technical difficulties will occur and you'll
have to work through them. If you cut yourself short, then go over
schedule, the program manager could look bad. (MacKenzie,
1998)
The AIM-9X program manager continues with specific comments about individual
incentives during the CAIV process.
The incentive for a program manager is to look good by building in
schedule and cost reserve so he can work through the difficulties.
It could be hard to look good when you cut yourself to the quick
during the CAIV process. My budget is realistic, unless I have a
problem. (MacKenzie, 1998)
The program manager is referring to promotions, peer esteem, and professional
pride as incentives to actively participate in the CAIV process.
c) User Incentives
User incentives to identify cost-performance trades are hard to define.
(Stutz, 1998) Commander Otto Stutz, the Navy's air-to-air missile requirements officer,
made the following comments. In all the cost-performance trades to date, the program
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office or contractor was the one that recommended cost-performance tradeoffs to the
user. From the author's experience, the user has never voluntarily recommended cost-
performance tradeoffs.
We really aren't driving the CAIV train, but we do own the
requirement. If an objective presentation of a CAIV opportunity is
presented to us, and we can save money, then it only makes sense
to do it. But we don't know about any cost-performance tradeoff
opportunities unless the contractor brings it to us. (Stutz, 1998)
Another concern expressed by the user was the program office's fixed
price incentive options for the contractor in the first three LRIP lots. The fixed price
incentive options complicate the user's incentive to actively participate in the CAIV
process. (Stutz, 1998) Since Raytheon keeps all savings below LRIP contracted prices,
any cost-performance tradeoff benefits the contractor in terms of increased profit. In the
short run, the user does not receive any benefits from the cost. (Stutz, 1 998) However,
in the long run, when the program manager and contractor negotiate contract prices for
production lots 4-7, the user should see lower prices based upon actual price data from
earlier production lots. (Stutz, 1998) The user can then decide whether to use the cost
savings elsewhere in the DoD Future Years Defense Plan, or increase AIM-9X quantity.
(Stutz, 1998)
4. Risk Management
During DEM/VAL the program office managed performance, schedule, and cost
risk through risk management plans submitted by Hughes and Raytheon as part of the
DEM/VAL contracts. A DoD Inspector General audit report stated that the AIM-9X risk
management plans identified assessed, mitigated, and initiated systems to effectively
manage performance, schedule, and cost risk. (DoDIG Report 97-064, p. 2) In E&MD,
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the program manager has assigned the AIM-9X program office and contractor IPTs joint
responsibility for implementing the risk management program. (AIM-9X SAMP, 1998)
User participation in selecting existing AIM-9M Sidewinder components for use
in the AIM-9X modification program also reduced program risk. The decision reduced
performance, schedule, and cost risk, and avoided the cost of developing new
components.
Finally, GAO observe that program managers can reduce technological and
performance risks if they select mature technologies. A GAO report, dated March 1998,
states the following about AIM-9X program risk.
Even though it is still too early to predict outcomes on the AIM-9X
missile...their prospects appear promising because they have chosen
mostly proven technology from existing programs to achieve performance
requirements. (GAO-T/NSAID-98-123, p.9)
E. COST SAVINGS
Table 5-2 outlines current RDT&E and procurement estimates (FY97 dollars)
required to complete the AIM-9X program. 7 Reductions in RDT&E in FY96 and FY97,
and reductions in weapon procurement resources in FY96 are attributable to the
implementation of CAIV in the AIM-9X program. The combined effects of the
producibility metrics program, competition, PPCC, and adjustments in E&MD contract
costs all contributed to the savings. (MacKenzie, 1998)
The program RDT&E cost estimates represent real savings in that Navy and Air
Force Comptrollers reduced the AIM-9X FY96 President's Budget request by $116
7 Program cost estimates are derived from the AIM-9X Program Office December 1993 Life Cycle Cost
estimate, the December 1994 Milestone IV/I Acquisition Program Baseline, and the September 1998
Defense Acquisition Executive Summary.
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93 628.0 2223.5 2851.5
94 640.2 2213.5 2853.7
95 648.3 2257.8 2906.1
96 531.4 1932.6 2464.0
97 520.5 2072.5 2593.0
98 532.7 1952.7 2485.4
Table 5-2, Annual Revisions of Total Life-Cycle Program Costs
Source: AIM-9X Program Office
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1 . DoDR 5000.2R designates programs with
procurement of $2,135 Billion or more as
ACAT I and is minimum axis value.
Figure 5-1
1
Source: AIM-9X Program Office
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F. SUMMARY OF CAIV IMPLEMENTATION INTO AIM-9X
As summarized in Table 5-3 the implementation of CAIV into the AIM-9X
program resulted in a diverse range of cost reduction activities during all stages of
program development. Cost-performance trades began early in program development
during the cost and operational effectiveness study of possible missile design options.
The user's decision not to develop a new rocket motor and new warhead for the AIM-9X
Sidewinder, but to continue use of existing AIM-9M Sidewinder components is another
example of cost-performance trades.
The Affordability IPT continue to look for cost-performance trades using
Raytheon's engineering cost model, and the CAIV ECP process. Use of Raytheon's cost
model, AUPC cost management system, and Price as a Technical requirement are
significant factors in the program's ability to set aggressive cost objectives.
AIM-9X cost reduction activities also include development of quantifiable
producibility metrics, development of contract incentives, such as the PPCC, 0/100-share
ratio, and the award fee structure, and development of contractor risk mitigation plans.
Finally, the cost reduction activities took place in a changing work environment
that fostered closer relationships between contractor and government personnel, and an
environment in which the program office retooled its organizational structure from a
functional structure to an IPT structure.
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• Risk identification plans
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reviewed quarterly
Table 5-3, Summary of AIM-9X Cost Reduction Activities
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VI. CAIV AS A STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
A. OVERVIEW
Previous chapters discussed environmental forces affecting DoD—budgetary
pressures, modernization requirements and military performance requirements—that
influence and incentivize participant's behaviors, and which in turn drive the cost of
weapon systems. Addressing this relationship has shaped a new acquisition strategy
focused on affordability. However, as discussed in the previous chapters the pressures on
and incentives for individual decision-makers may not be consistent with a focus on
affordability. If the new acquisition strategy is to succeed, management control of
individuals, and their cost activities is required (Figure 6-1).

























It can be argued that CAIV has the potential to meet this need by functioning as a
management control system. Using the AIM-9X case study, can this research
characterize CAIV as a management control system? If it can, how did the CAIV control
system change AIM-9X organizational behaviors and incentives? Did it change the
environment in which those decisions took place? I address these questions in three parts
to this chapter. The first part compares CAIV objectives, as implemented by the AIM-9X
program office, to the generic management control model developed in Chapter IV to
analyze the proposition that CAIV is a strategic management control system. The second
part uses Simons' model of Levers of Control (1995) to discuss in what ways the AIM-
9X organization used the CAIV control system. The last part discusses possible barriers
to the implementation of CAIV when extended beyond the AIM-9X program.
B. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
Robert Anthony states, "in order to be useful, information about any subject needs
to be organized around a framework." This section analyzes CAIV in a management
control framework, which may assist program managers in how to think about CAIV.
Paraphrasing Anthony, program managers should recognize CAIV as one part of a
broader process that has to do with control in an organization. The following section
provides one perspective on the broader process.
1. Strategic Management Control System Model
I previously noted the varied definitions of CAIV—strategy, initiative, policy,
process, and philosophy—and the ambiguity this causes, which may effect its
implementation. A clear definition of CAIV emerges when its objectives are thought of
in a management control context. The following subsections compare CAIV objectives,
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as implemented by the AIM-9X program office, to each element of the model.
Reproduced below are the elements of the generic management control model from
Chapter IV:
• Plan organizational goals
• Communicate goals and objectives
• Determine outputs and standards for assessment
• Detect information, activities, or behaviors
• Rewards, incentives, and sanctions
• Evaluate information about activities, or behaviors against standards
• Initiate feedback to ensure organization stays on strategic course
a) Plan Organizational Goals
The CAIV control system helps shape organizational goals by providing
the linkage between DoD strategy and AIM-9X organizational goals and objectives. The
CAIV control system provides specific objectives, which integrate DoD acquisition
strategy with AIM-9X organizational goals and objectives. CAIV established
producibility and affordability exit criteria that the program must achieve prior to OSD
approval for production. The AIM-9X organizational goals and objectives are to meet
exit criteria contained in the Acquisition Decision Memorandum issued by the Milestone
Decision Authority (Appendix B). There is a direct relationship between the exit criteria
and DoD acquisition strategy.
• Analyze cost experience and price projection to confirm the ability to produce
AIM-9X missiles at the price established in the LRIP contract.
103
• Demonstrate critical manufacturing processes using manufacturing
capabilities, factory transition, and design stability metrics.
The affordability and producibility exit criteria are a major part of the
CAIV control system. A contractor-government team interactively developed the
planning goals, and made them a part of the CAIV control system in order to set the
direction, tone, and focus for the organization's people, behavior, and tasks.
Implementation of DoD acquisition strategy is accomplished through the CAIV control
system and its establishment of AIM-9X organizational goals—the producibility and
affordability exit criteria.
b) Communicate Goals and Objectives
The CAIV control system uses a hierarchy of IPTs to communicate DoD
acquisition strategy and AIM-9X organizational goals and objectives through the
organization. IPTs are the primary method the control system uses to communicate goals
and objectives, and to initiate and receive feedback. Communication of AIM-9X goals
and objectives through the organizational structure is essential for effective management
control. As I previously noted, according to the DoD Guide For Leading Successful IPTs
(1995), the teams operate under the broad principles of open discussions, with no secrets,
continuous "up the line" communication, and issues raised early and resolved early.
These IPT principles are the requirements for effective communication.
The CAIV control system uses three principle IPTs—the Overarching IPT,
the Cost-performance IPT, and the Affordability IPT to communicate goals and
objectives. The Overarching IPT provides strategic direction and communicates the
importance of the DoD affordability strategy to the subordinate Cost-performance IPT.
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The Cost-performance IPT, chaired by the program manager, provides program oversight
and review. It is the vehicle to communicate program status and unresolved issues up or
down the organizational chain. Finally, the Affordability IPT communicates
organizational goals to individual contractor design teams at Raytheon.
To help facilitate communication within the CAIV control system, the
AIM-9X program office reorganized its functional organizational structure into an IPT
structure. The AIM-9X IPT organizational structure is a vehicle for an interactive
communication process. For example, government and contractor personnel used this
process to establish the AUPC cost target during DEM/VAL. Inclusion of the AUPC
cost target in the E&MD contract communicate to the contractor the direction in which it
should proceed. Similarly, the contractor's AUPC cost management system, and its use
of cost models early in the design process, communicate the importance of affordability
to each member of Raytheon's design teams.
c) Determine Outputs and Standardsfor Assessment
OSD CAIV policy requires the program manager to set aggressive, but
realistic cost objectives early in the design process. OSD CAIV policy also requires the
use of metrics, a system of quantifiable measurements, to assess program progress. The
CAIV control system includes several metrics to determine if the program can achieve its
planning goals. Since the planning goals require meeting affordability and producibility
exit criteria prior to production approval, the Affordability IPT uses the following metrics
to set standards and determine outputs:
• Average Unit Procurement Cost (cost of 5000th unit)
• Average Unit Cost (average cost of one production lot)
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• Procurement Price Commitment Curve
• Producibility Metrics
The IPT uses a contractor-established missile Average Unit Procurement
Cost, and contracted prices, called Average Unit Cost, for the first three production lots,
as determinants in whether the program can achieve its exit criteria. Additionally, the
Affordability IPT established a joint government-contractor goal of lowering the cost of
"Tl", the Average Unit Cost of the first production lot, 10 percent below the contracted
price (Figure 6-2).
mi Average Unit Cost

















Figure 6-2 Source: AIM-9X Program Office
A downward adjustment in the cost of the first production lot allows the contractor to
increase profit an additional 1 percent, and saves the user in the long run by decreasing
future defense budgets required for production lots 4-7, or allows the user the option to
buy more units.
106
The contractor-established Procurement Price Commitment Curve for
production lots 4-7 is another standard the Affordability IPT will use to assess program
progress towards meeting the affordability and producibility exit criteria. If Raytheon
prices meet or fall below the Commitment Curve, they will retain sole source production
of AIM-9X and not have to compete against another defense contractor. They also retain
configuration control, depot maintenance, and not endure government oversight.
Lastly, the AIM-9X program uses producibility metrics to determine if the
program office and contractor are managing to achieve its unit cost goals. Producibility
metrics are a component of the management control system. Demonstration of
manufacturing capability, design stability, and factory transition to full rate production
are the standards for assessing weather the program can exit from the E&MD stage of
development and proceed into production.
d) Detect Information, Activities, or Behaviors
This control element is composed of components of the control system,
such as a series of reports that detect information for evaluation. The AIM-9X program
uses several components of the CAIV control system to detect information, activities, or
behaviors:
• Contractor Producibility Reports
• Cost Model Outputs
• CAIV Engineering Change Proposals
The Affordability IPT uses contractor producibility metrics reports to
predict whether the contractor's design teams can meet its cost requirements. The reports
allow the Affordability IPT to predict whether the contractor can produce at the
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throughput and yields required to meet unit cost objectives prior to the start of low rate
initial production.
Contractor design teams use outputs from its cost model to predict if it can
meet its cost requirement. Since Raytheon's AUPC cost management system establishes
a cost requirement for each design team, the cost model forces the design team to
consider alternative designs, conduct 'what if analysis, and study the implications of
each potential decision.
The cost model is a component of the control system that can detect cost-
performance tradeoff opportunities, and allow engineers on the design team to think
about cost-performance tradeoffs in order to meet its cost requirement. The CAIV ECP
process is a component of the system, which puts the cost-performance tradeoff
opportunities into motion.
Rewards, incentives, and sanctions are tied to this component of the CAIV
control system, and is covered in the next subsection.
e) Rewards, Incentives, and Sanctions
The CAIV control system uses rewards, incentives, and sanctions to
ensure that actual performance meets or exceeds standards. The AIM-9X program office
uses the CAIV control system to incentivize the contractor to lower production prices,
which yields larger profit. If the AIM-9X program manager decides that actual
performance meets or exceeds standard performance, he can financially reward the
contractor. For example, if the contractor can perform below the contracted prices set for
the first three production lots, the 0/100-share ratio allows the contractor to keep 100
percent of the savings. If the contractor does not perform to its Commitment Curve, the
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AIM-9X program manager could issue sanctions by competing production lots 4-7
instead of exercising an option to continue sole source production. CAIV thus
incentivizes the contractor to lower production prices, and it rewards the contractor with
savings generated from lower production prices.
Additionally, the CAIV control system uses award fees to provide
incentives to the contractor to meet producibility and affordability exit criteria—the
program's organizational goals. Thus the control system ties rewards to organizational
goals, and ultimately, to DoD acquisition strategy.
Rewards, incentives, and sanctions for the contractor are easy to identify
because of the profit motive. Evidence from the AIM-9X case indicate that rewards and
incentives for the program manager is harder to identify. However, the program manager
appears motivated by direction from DoDD 5000.2R, a desire for program stability, and
professional rewards, such as promotion and peer esteem, which incentivize the AIM-9X
program manager to meet organizational planning goals. Later in this chapter I discuss
user incentives.
j) Evaluate Information About Activities, or Behaviors Against
Standards
In the CAIV control system much of management control is accomplished
through the interaction and coordination of three key managers—the Affordability IPT
manager, the AIM-9X program manager, and the Raytheon program manager—and their
respective IPTs. The IPTs not only function as a communication vehicle in the control
system, but they also function as an evaluator of information.
The interaction process between the three key managers, and their
respective teams, determine whether differences in actual performance measures and
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standard performance measures warrant action. Wade Smith and the Raytheon design
teams, Major Goldstien and the Affordability IPT, Captain MacKenzie and the Cost-
performance IPT, evaluate and coordinate information from the CAIV control system to
determine if the program can meet organizational goals, and implement the DoD
affordability strategy. The team evaluates and coordinates information from contractor
producibility reports, cost model outputs, and CAIV ECP proposals against the
producibility and affordability metrics. A determination is made as to whether action is
required by a team in order to meet organizational goals.
g) Initiate Feedback
The CAIV control system uses a hierarchy of IPTs as its feedback
mechanism. It is through a series of linked IPTs that information from the CAIV control
system flows up from contractor-level IPTs, to AIM-9X program management, and
ultimately, to DoD leadership. Figure 6-3 illustrates the linkage. For example, cost
model outputs and producibility reports flow from the contractor design IPTs, to the
Affordability IPT, where they compare the information to the metrics. Information from
this process flows up to the AIM-9X program management IPT, where the information is
compared to the organizational planning goals. Eventually, information from the CAIV
control system is linked to the CPIPT, as part of its oversight and review function, and
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Figure 6-3
The IPT structure provides a clear linkage for the flow of information
from the CAIV control system from the contractor, to the program office, to oversight
and review teams, and ultimately, to the Milestone Decision Authority. The IPT
feedback mechanism ultimately links the contractor and program office performance to
DoD acquisition strategy.
2. Summary
A managerial framework begins to emerge when seemingly disjointed
information from the AIM-9X case study is put into a management control context. One
of the problems with the DoD CAIV working group report is that its list of CAIV
objectives does not a unifying perspective. The report merely lists CAIV objectives with
no managerial framework to support it. Too many definitions of CAIV exist and
priorities differ about what is important in CAIV implementation.
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When the implementation of CAIV into the AIM-9X program is viewed in the
context of management control system we can observe the components of the control
system. They are the exit criteria, or planning goals and objectives, a communication
mechanism, or the linked IPTs, the producibility and affordability metrics, which are the
standards for assessments, evaluation, and feedback. CAIV is a strategic management
control system that helps ensure the implementation of DoD acquisition strategy. It is
strategic in the sense that the hierarchy of IPTs links the lowest levels of organizational
behavior to DoD acquisition strategy.
It is in the CAIV control system that organizational participants can consider a
whole range of cost reduction activities, not just cost-performance tradeoffs that some
consider the essence of CAIV. The CAIV system can control behaviors and incentives
that lead to decisions affecting cost. It is a control linkage between acquisition strategy,
organizational goals and objectives, and organizational behavior.
C. CAIV: SIMONS FOUR LEVERS OF CONTROL
How is the strategic CAIV management control system used in the AIM-9X
program? Evidence from the AIM-9X case study seems to indicate that it is a hybrid of
all four levers of control (Simons, 1995) discussed in Chapter IV.
1. Belief System
Simons defines beliefs systems as an explicit set of basic values, purpose, and
direction. "These values are linked to the business strategy of the firm." (Simons, 1995,
p.34) The CAIV objectives listed by the OSD working group report are characteristic of
a belief system in that they represent a new DoD direction, and a new focus on
affordability. The DoD Guide For Leading Successful IPTs (1995) represents a change
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in working relationships between government and contractor personnel. Major
Goldstien, Affordability IPT manager, and Wade Smith, Raytheon AIM-9X program
manager both commented on the increased level of trust and open communication
between government and contractor personnel.
The use of mission statements in the CAIV control system communicates the new
DoD strategic direction to members of its organization. They provide an opportunity to
create new working relationships between government and contractor personnel.
• AIM-9X mission statement: Our contractor/government team will deliver to
the warfighter an affordable AIM-9X weapon system that meets stated
performance requirements within schedule.
• Affordability IPT mission statement: To recommend opportunities for
reducing AIM-9X costs from initial product development through the entire
life cycle.
The statements are an explicit set of beliefs that define DoD strategic direction,
AIM-9X organizational goals, and the focus of Affordability IPT work activities. They
provide guidance for behaviors in the organization and make it acceptable for engineers
and management to question the user's requirement and consider cost-performance
tradeoffs.
2. Boundary System
Simons states that "boundary systems delineate the acceptable domain of
activity." (Simons, 1995, p.39) Boundary systems are "formally stated rules and limits
to the conduct of business." (Simons, 1995, p. 178) When CAIV is thought of in a
management control framework, boundaries as to what is acceptable behavior begins to
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emerge. New boundaries appear and old boundaries fade way. For example,
"requirements creep" from the user community, and contractor "gold-plating" behavior is
no longer expectable behavior. Engineers are no longer allowed to add "bells and
whistles" to generate higher profits. Instead, the CAIV control system encourages
engineers "to think CAIV," and consider cost-performance tradeoffs in order to meet the
producibility and affordability exit criteria. The result is that engineers may step into the
user's boundary and begin to question the user's requirement.
The AIM-9X Cost-performance IPT is a useful mechanism for controlling
acceptable behaviors and incentives. From the cost savings generated by the AIM-9X
program, evidence exists which suggest that controlling behavior was key to controlling
costs. Examples from the case study include user willingness to avoid developmental
cost of a new rocket motor and warhead for the AIM-9X missile prior to DEM/VAL, and
the eight Operational Requirements Document changes prior to E&MD.
The AIM-9X program manager's decision to limit trade space to non-KPPs is
another example of setting boundaries in the tradeoff process. He uses the CAIV control
system to establish a boundary for acceptable behavior.
3. Diagnostic System
Components of the CAIV control system, and the rewards and incentives attached
to the system, are characteristic of a diagnostic control system. The hierarchy of IPTs is
the feedback and control mechanism that monitors progress in achieving AIM-9X
organizational goals. The Affordability IPT established a set of producibility metrics and
use contractor reports to evaluate progress. The IPT also conducts quarterly reviews of
the metrics to ascertain whether the outputs continue to relate to the program's
affordability and producibility exit criteria.
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The AIM-9X program also uses output data from other components of the CAIV
control system—Average Unit Cost, PPCC, and the cost model output—as diagnostic
control. The Affordability IPT monitors the outputs and evaluates whether the program
can achieve its exit criteria.
Rewards and incentives are linked to goal achievement. For example, the
program manager uses award fees to incentivize the contractor to meet program
management criteria in the following areas
—
program management, systems engineering,
technical performance, producibility, and reliability. The 0/100-share ratio and PPCC
also incentivize Raytheon to meet established cost targets and contracted prices.
4. Interactive System
The CAIV control system is the vehicle that focuses management on strategic
uncertainty. Interactive systems focus organizational attention on strategic uncertainties
and provoke the emergence of new initiatives. (Simons, 1995, p. 180) Figure 6-4
provides the framework for how the program interactively used the CAIV control system.








































In the upper left hand quadrant is the DoD acquisition strategy. In Chapter II, I
discussed the DoD requirement to procure weapons faster, better, and cheaper. (Gansler,
1998) The strategy is to focus on acquiring "best value" products and services.
(Kaminski, 1995) The focus is on affordability in order to pay for modernization.
(Gansler, 1998)
In order to implement this strategy, the AIM-9X program manager interactively
uses the CAIV control system to focus organizational attention on strategic uncertainties.
As depicted in Figure 6-4, the search for uncertainties targets technical risk, operational
requirements, and funding as sources of disruption. After identifying the uncertainties,
the bottom right hand quadrant of Figure 6-4 illustrates the program manager using the
control system to deal with the uncertainties—controlling cost behavior to prevent
requirements creep and gold-plating behavior, selecting mature missile technology,
developing an engineering cost model to assist in cost-performance tradeoffs, and using
appropriate metrics and standards for assessments.
Management uses the CAIV control system to signal to members of each IPT
what is important to the organization. Debate and dialogue between contractor personnel,
government personnel, and the user provides a catalyst for finding new cost reduction
activities to deal with strategic uncertainty. Specifically, the program interactively used
the CAIV control system in the following ways:
• The program manager frequently interacted with subordinate and superior
IPTs to ensure the continuation of cost control activities and implementation of the DoD
affordability strategy. The program manager shared information generated by the CAIV
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control system with team members from all levels of the organization, then evaluated the
information in an IPT process to determine if action was required.
• Selection of a mature missile design technology for the AIM-9X missile
significantly reduced strategic uncertainty. The program manager opted to use a mature,
more predictable and affordable technology for the AIM-9X missile development, which
reduced cost risk and uncertainty.
• Changing the AIM-9X organization from a functional structure to an IPT
structure meant that individuals would have to learn to work in a new environment.
Government and contractor personnel learned to work in an environment that fostered
teamwork, trust, and cooperation.
• Government and contractor management began to comprehend the importance
of the DoD affordability strategy and the need for effective cost control. Through an
interactive process a government/contractor team established the AUPC cost target,
prices for the first three production lots, average unit cost for the first three production
lots, and the PPCC for lots 4-7 as means to achieve cost control.
• A contractor/government team established specially designed incentives
unique to the program in order to reduce costs. The program's award fee plan, 0/100
share ratio plan, and PPCC curve, unique to the AIM-9X program, was established
through an interactive CAIV process between a team of government and contractor
personnel.
• Engineers on each Raytheon design team began to learn the importance of
owning a cost requirement, as well as technical and performance requirements. Raytheon
integrated its cost model down to all levels of the contractor development team. Price as
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a Technical Requirement is the result of an integrated team analysis, and all team leads
have responsibility for meeting its required cost goal. The design teams learn early in the
design process whether its cost requirement can be met by applying "what if statements
to the cost model.
• Through debate and dialogue in the Affordability IPT and the Cost-
Performance IPT the program manager triggers the search for new opportunities to
reduce cost through cost-performance tradeoffs and other cost reduction activities. The
Affordability IPT provides a "focus and a forum" for the continuing search, such as
through the CAIV ECP process. The Cost-Performance IPT ensures the user is involved
in the tradeoff process and the search for new requirements tradeoff opportunities.
• Through debate and dialogue in the IPT process the user learned that
requirements creep could not be tolerated in an environment focused on affordability.
Contractor personnel learned the same lesson in that the IPT process no longer tolerated
gold-plating behavior.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter analyzed and discussed CAIV from the viewpoint that is a
management control system. Components of the CAIV control system were identified
using the generic management control model from Chapter IV. The AIM-9X exit criteria
are the organizational goals and objectives. The IPT structure is the vehicle the program
uses to communicate DoD strategy and program goals and objectives. The producibility
and affordability criteria are the program's standards for assessment when measuring
progress towards meeting the organizational goals and objectives using information
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generated from the CAIV control system. The CAIV control system is strategic in the
sense that it is responsible for implementing DoD acquisition strategy.
Additionally, the preceding discussion described how the AIM-9X program used
the CAIV control system in ways that resemble Simons' Levers ofControl (1995). From
viewing the CAIV control system in the AIM-9X case study it appears that it is a hybrid
of all four levers of control. The CAIV control system appears to facilitate the
implementation of DoD acquisition strategy when it is used as a belief system, boundary
systems, a diagnostic system, and an interactive system.
119
120
VII. CAIV IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
A. OVERVIEW
Special issues exist when a program implements CAIV. The issues emerge from
the author's previous experience with the CAIV implementation process, from the AIM-
9X case study, and its supporting research. The next section discusses program
ownership, cost models, and trade space as special issues to consider when implementing
CAIV into program management that may affect the level of control a program has in the
management of cost reduction.
B. PROGRAM OWNERSHIP
The literature makes explicit that the key tenant to CAIV is increased user
involvement (Rush, 1995), but it is not clear that the mere existence of cost objectives,
and a formal tradeoff process, creates incentives for the user to actively participate. The
CAIV working group state "a more formal cost-performance tradeoff process will
motivate both government and industry by clarifying objectives, fostering feedback, and
empowering decision-making." (Longuemare, 1995) From the user's viewpoint, it is not
clear that this is actually true. Evidence to the contrary exists from the AIM-9X case
study in Stutz's comments about "not driving the CAIV train." (Stutz, 1998) The issue
is important because it is the user's requirement that is subject to tradeoffs.
The user may not actively participate in the tradeoff process because the user and
the program manager work in different organizational structures. The reporting chain of
command, culture, behaviors, and incentives are different for the user and the program
manager. Differences exist between the user and the program manager as to their
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respective organizational roles and cultures. If indeed, "the central feature of CAIV is the
tradeoff process," then the differences in organizational roles and cultures may be a
barrier to effective implementation. (Rush, 1997, p. 165) "Changing the culture
regarding lesser but acceptable performance is critical to successful implementation of
CAIV." (Rush, 1997, p. 165) The difficulty lies in changing two cultures in two separate
organizations. As indicated by remarks by Dr. Oliver (PDUSD (A&T)) to the CAIV
Flagship Workshop, the existing organizational structures do not allow the user to
actively participate in the CAIV process as much as possible. (Oliver, 1998)
From Figure 6-5 we can see that the user controls the decision support system for
requirements generation, and controls the budgeting process decision support system,
which determines the amount of financial resources for weapons development and
production. The program manager controls the acquisition management decision support
system. What is the user's incentive to participate in the acquisition management's
decision support system, which is outside his organizational structure, and may result in
lower performance standards? Why trade off a funded requirement that had to complete
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Since the user controls two of the three decision support systems, and is not in the
acquisition manager's organizational structure, the user could possible take exception to
specific elements of CAIV policy. For example, Dr. Land, from Defense Systems
Management College, states that the program manager should give a continuous and
honest assessment of trading off requirements to meet cost objectives. (Land, 1997, p.28)
The user may take exception to a program manager trading off his requirement.
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COST AND REQUIREMENTS
A particular popular notion within the Pentagon to support the idea of cost
savings is that CAIV can achieve a "80 percent solution." (Kaminski, 1995) In other
words, CAIV can achieve 80 percent of the requirement at half the cost. This
relationship may be a convenient way to think about cost-performance tradeoff
relationships, but may bear little resemblance to the real relationship. The statement
assumes such cost-performance relationship models exist, and that defense contractors
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can predict, down to the sub-component level, cost versus performance relationships such
as the one depicted in Figure 6-6. Also, cost-performance models may be system
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relationship implied by the 80 percent solution. For instance, is there a cost-performance
tradeoff relationship that exists between missile seeker acquisition range and cost? Is the
relationship exponential or linear? Is technology a factor in the relationship?
In the AIM-9X case, Wade Smith stated that only in an indirect way could the
Raytheon cost model predict relationships such as the one depicted in Figure 6-6. As I
mentioned in Chapter III, Dr. Rush states that such relationships are a key factor in the
tradeoff process. From my experience as the AIM-9X requirements officer, and from the
AIM-9X case study, the Raytheon cost model cannot predict this type of relationship. If
it did, it would certainly aid the user, and program manager, in getting beyond the cost-
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performance tradeoffs that have already occurred in the AIM-9X program, in the search
for further cost reductions.
D. TRADE SPACE
The idea that the program manager and Cost-Performance IPT can trade away the
user's performance requirements implies the existence of tradeoffs in some defined trade
space. However, ambiguous definitions of trade space exist in the CAIV literature. For
example, Higgins describes KPPs as those "requirements that the program manager may
not trade off." (Higgins, 1997, p. 46) In other words, the program manager can trade off
system performance requirements as long as KPPs are met. DoDD 5000.2R (1996)
makes no such distinction between system performance parameters and KPPs in the trade
off process. It does say however, that if changes to threshold values are required, the
program manager shall ensure that the changes are brought forward to Operational
Requirements Document approval authorities. This statement implies that all
requirements, regardless of status, are tradeable. On the other hand, Dr. Rush, from
Defense Systems Management College, states that for KPPs the only trade space for
KPPs exists between the threshold and objective values. (Rush, 1997, p. 163)
Two other definitions of trade space include minimizing the number of
performance requirements or establishing upper and lower cost objectives. The user can
decrease the number of performance parameters, which creates trade space by allowing
the contractor to explore less costly design options. (DoDD 5000.2R, 1996) The Cost-
Performance IPT can "shape" the requirements if "true" user requirements are kept to a
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threshold parameters, and the cost objective of a weapon built to objective parameters.
(Oliver, 1998) Figure 6-7 summarizes the definitions of trade space.
The point of the preceding discussion is that trade space definitions run counter to
at least some of the user's behaviors and incentives discussed in the previous chapter, and
could adversely affect a program's use of the CAIV management control system by:
• Expecting increased weapon capabilities with little regard to cost
• Setting detailed requirements early in the process to legitimize the
requirement
• "Gold-plating" or requirements creep
• Expecting cutting-edge, immature technology to further legitimize the
requirement
The AIM-9X CAIV control system overcame this barrier by the use of its IPTs.
Although the user is "not driving the CAIV train," he certainly did not ask for cutting
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edge technology, the program manager selected a mature technology that would reduce
program risk. Additionally, there was not one instance of "requirements creep" in this
program. User participation in the Cost-Performance IPT process was effective
controlling behaviors that lead to higher costs.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter discussed special issues
—
program ownership, cost models, and trade
space—that the program manager should consider during the implementation of CAIV,
which may affect the use ofCAIV as management control system.
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VIII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
CAIV has many descriptions—a strategy, an initiative, a process, a target costing
methodology. DoD and DON policies differ about what is the most important cost
reduction activity. Are cost-performance tradeoffs the "essence" of CAIV, or is it any
cost reduction activity? This research attempts to demonstrate that CAIV is a product of
a need to change the way the acquisition community conducts business. The
implementation of an acquisition strategy based upon affordability is critical to DoD if it
is to afford modern weapon systems and increase procurement to $60 billion. When used
in the sense of implementing strategies CAIV is a strategic management control system.
The list of CAIV objectives is not a "conceptual approach," or a managerial framework
that program managers can refer to in their implementation of CAIV. But when thought
of in the context of a management control system, partly responsible for the
implementation of DoD acquisition strategy, a managerial framework takes shape, which
can assist the program manager in its implementation of CAIV. Additionally, the CAIV
control system functions in a way that resembles Simons' model of levers of control. A
program can use the CAIV control system as a belief system, a diagnostic system, a
boundary system, and an interactive system. A program manger can use the CAIV
control system in any of the four ways to facilitate the implementation of strategy.
B. CONCLUSIONS
• When control is used in the sense of implementing strategies, CAIV has the
attributes of a strategic management control system. The focus of DoD acquisition
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strategy is to reduce costs by transforming its business practices into "best commercial
practices," which will enable "faster, cheaper, and better" weapon systems production.
Implementation of the CAIV control system helps the program manager engage in
control activities that helps DoD achieve its desired outcomes.
• The proposition provides program managers a theoretical construct, or
framework, about how to unambiguously think and apply CAIV in their programs. The
generic management control systems model, and Simon's four levers of control, is a
framework that can assist program managers in the implementation of CAIV.
• The hierarchy of IPTs is a critical communication component to the CAIV
control system. The IPTs link the communication of DoD acquisition strategy and AIM-
9X organizational goals and objectives from the top of DoD leadership down to
individual contractor teams. Representation of all stakeholders on the IPTs serves as a
communication mechanism, and enables the break down of organizational boundaries
that can hinder effective communication.
• The hierarchy of IPTs is a critical control component to the CAIV control
system. The IPTs are an effective control mechanism for controlling participant's
behaviors and incentives that lead to decisions, which can affect higher costs. For
example, the evidence indicates that requirements creep did not occur in this program due
in large part to the IPT process. The IPT facilitated a teaming arrangement with
government and contractor personnel, which built trust and cooperation among the IPT
members.
• Within the CAIV control system use of the Cost-Performance IPT is a way to
break down boundaries by including members from different organizations. In other
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words, all stakeholders are included in the decision-making process. As a stakeholder,
the user "owns the requirement," and therefore, the user is probably the biggest
stakeholder. Inclusion of the user into the Cost-Performance IPT helps change the user's
behavior by making him a part of the cost-performance tradeoff process.
• The AIM-9X program attempts to control behavior by using its IPT structure,
particularly the Affordability IPT, to communicate the direction in which the organization
should proceed. For example, the Affordability IPT gets people "to think CAIV". It has
communicated a need to change the environment, and made it acceptable for engineers to
recommend cost-performance trades.
• Cost-performance tradeoffs do not appear to be the "essence" of CAIV, but
rather CAIV may be characterized as a control system encompassing a range of cost
reduction activities. It is evident from the AIM-9X case study that cost-performance
tradeoffs were not the primary cost reduction activity. The scope of work in the
Affordability IPT went beyond cost-performance trades to encompass many cost
reduction activities. They focused on producibility, manufacturing practices, cost
modeling, and life cycle cost reductions, in addition to formal cost-performance tradeoffs
through the CAIV ECP process.
• The CAIV control system focused organizational attention on affordability,
but transformation of the AIM-9X organization into an IPT structure resulted in a change
in the working environment, which made it possible to change participant's behaviors
and incentives, and helped facilitate the change in focus.
• The CAIV control system must provide incentives to the user to actively
participate in a decision support system that is outside his organizational structure. It
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must produce cost models that can accurately predict the relationship between cost and
operational requirements, and define trade space in a way that agrees with all
stakeholders in the control system.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
• DoD must get beyond the "financial activities and property
accountability" connotation of management control and think of management control
systems as strategic. Management control is not a "paper exercise," but a system, which
is a key factor in the implementation of strategy.
• Program managers should use CAIV as the primary control system to
reduce costs and focus the entire organization on the need to implement DoD strategy.
• Program managers should consider special issues, such as
—
program
ownership, trade space, and cost models—as those that could possibly affect the
implementation of a CAIV control system.
• Program managers should implement CAIV with the knowledge that
CAIV encompasses a wide range of cost reduction activities, not just cost-performance
tradeoffs.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Cost savings versus cost avoidance
Is the purpose of CAIV to save real budgeted dollars to cure "sick", under-funded
programs, or is avoidance of cost the purpose? A GAO report includes data from 63
major military weapon programs on acquisition reform's effect on weapon system.
(GAO/NSAID-98-3 1 , p.l) The report included budgeted and unbudgeted cost
reductions. The military services estimated acquisition reform reduced the cost of major
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weapon programs by $29 billion. Only $8 billion is in budgeted reduction, and $21
billion is in unbudgeted cost reductions, or cost avoidance.
GAO concludes that to date the extent and degree to which savings generated by
CAIV will be available to help fund DoD investment accounts for modernization remains
in question. (GAO/PEMD-98-31, p.6) The same report concludes that acquisition
reform initiatives such as CAIV have only been in use for a few years, and their full
impact is not yet assessed. (GAO/PEMD-98-31, p.6) Additional research is required to
assess whether acquisition reform savings are of sufficient magnitude to make a positive
difference in DoD investment accounts.
2. Formulation of Acquisition Strategy
It was beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct an in depth study into the
formulation of acquisition strategy, but a deeper understanding of how DoD leadership
formulates strategy and the effectiveness of management control systems in the
implementation of strategy would benefit the acquisition community. It would also aid in
the development of management control thought in DoD from a system of internal




APPENDIX A—SIMON'S FOUR LEVERS OF CONTROL
Lever #1: Beliefs Systems
What explicit set of beliefs that define basic values, purpose, and direction, including
how value is created; level of desired performance; and human relationships





When opportunities expand dramatically
top managers desire to change strategic direction
top managers desire to energize workforce
Who senior managers personally write substantive drafts
staff groups facilitate communication, feedback, and awareness surveys
Lever #2: Boundary Systems
What formally stated rules, limits, and proscriptions tied to defined sanctions
and credible threat of punishment
Why to allow individual creativity within defined limits of freedom




When Business Conduct Boundaries: when reputation costs are high
Strategic Boundaries: when excessive search and experimentation risk
dissipating the resources of the firm
Who senior managers formulate with the technical assistance of staff experts
(e.g. lawyers) and personally mete out punishment
staff groups monitor compliance
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Lever #3: Diagnostic Control Systems
What feedback system that monitor organizational outcomes and correct
deviations from the preset standards of performance
Why to allow effective resource allocations
to define goals
to provide motivation
to establish guidelines for corrective action
to allow ex post evaluation
How set standards
measure outputs
link incentives to goal achievement
When performance standards can be preset
outputs can be measured
feedback information can be used to influence or correct deviations from
the standard
process or output is a critical performance variable
Who senior managers set or negotiate goals, receive and review exception
reports, follow-up significant exceptions
staff groups maintain systems, gather data, and prepare exception reports
Lever #4 Interactive Control Systems
What control systems that managers use to involve themselves regularly and
personally in the decision activities of subordinates
Why to focus organizational attention on strategic uncertainties and provoke the
emergence of new initiatives
How ensure that data generated by the system becomes an important and
recurring agenda in discussions with subordinates
ensure that the system is the focus of regular attention by managers
throughout the organization
participate in face-to-face meetings with subordinates
continually challenge and debate date, assumptions, and action plans
When strategic uncertainties require search for disruptive change and
opportunities
Who senior managers activey use the system and assign subjective, effort-based
rewards
staff groups act a facilitators
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Internal Control Systems
What systems that safeguard assets from theft or accidental loss and ensure
reliable accounting records and financial information systems
Why to prevent inefficiency in transaction processing, flawed decisions based
on inaccurate data, fraud
How Structural safeguards
active audit committee
independent internal audit function
segregation of duties
defined levels of authorization
restricted access to valuable assets
Staff safeguards
adequate expertise and training for all accounting, control, and
internal audit staff
sufficient resources
rotation in key jobs
Systems safeguards
complete and accurate documentation
adequate documentation and audit trail
relevent and timely management reporting
restricted access to information systems and data bases
When at all times in all businesses
Who staff professionals (trained accountants, independent auditors)
managers usually should not spend much time designing or reviewing the
details of internal controls
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APPENDIX B—AIM-9X PROGRAM EXIT CRITERIA
Exit Criteria to Enter Low-Rate Initial Production
• Demonstrate Key Performance Parameters and APB threshold reliability
and maintainability requirements are achievable through a combination of
development test and analysis, including
• Rated as potentially operationally effective and potentially
operationally suitable in the Operational Assessment, based on at least 200
hours of captive carry and five guided missile firings in OT-IIA
• Analyze cost experience and price projections to confirm the ability to
produce AIM-9X missiles at the price established in the LRIP option.
• Demonstrate critical manufacturing processes using manufacturing
capability, factory transition, and design stability metrics.
Exit Criteria to Enter Full-Rate Initial Production
• Demonstrate Key Performance Parameters are met through a combination of
operational test and analysis.
• Demonstrate critical manufacturing processes using manufacturing capability,
factory transition, and design stability metrics.
• Demonstrate APB threshold reliability and maintainability requirements are
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